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Over seventy years ago, the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure represented the triumph of equity over the often-arbitrary 
distinctions created by the common law pleading and code pleading 
systems that predated them.1  Despite equity’s expansion beyond 
pleading and into most areas of litigation, there still remains an area 
where the rules of procedure are inflexible and complex:  the current 
system of post-trial motions and notices of appeal often creates 
“trap[s] for an unsuspecting litigant”2 during the transfer of a case to 
the court of appeals from the district court.  Limitations on the power 
of the district court to hear motions after the judgment have long 
                                                          
1 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 973-74 (1987) (describing 
the proponents of the federal rules’ view that “[t]he New Deal required courts to re-
solve new types of complex cases, for which procedural lines would be an outdated im-
pediment” while “[o]ther cases were so simple they did not need procedural lines and 
steps” so that “[i]f one eliminated definitional lines and procedural steps . . . one could 
have simple general rules for all cases”). 
2 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (report-
ing that the previous version of the rule often deceived litigants into failing to file a 
proper notice of appeal by nullifying a notice that was prematurely filed before a post-
trial motion or while the motion was pending).  For a more complete listing of 
amendments to correct similar traps, see infra note 250. 
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been viewed as having “jurisdictional significance,”3 and courts view 
the deadlines as “mandatory and jurisdictional.”4  This use of the term 
“jurisdictional” prevents resort to equitable principles that could ex-
cuse noncompliance in certain cases where strict litigation deadlines 
create harsh results.5
Several examples show that the rejection of equity has seriously 
limited the ability of litigants to have a district court or court of ap-
peals entertain challenges to a judgment through either a post-trial 
motion or appeal.  The Supreme Court has denied a litigant the op-
portunity to appeal a judgment because the litigant relied on a date 
set incorrectly by a district court judge, resulting in an untimely ap-
peal.6  The Court has also found jurisdiction lacking and dismissed an 
appeal when an appellant used “et al.” to designate the identity of 
those appealing under Appellate Rule 3, instead of listing all plaintiffs 
individually or using a clearer term like “all plaintiffs.”7  The lack of 
equity results in seemingly unfair and often-shocking sanctions for 
minor procedural defects, not because the results are “imposed by the 
legislature,” as the Court has stated, but because courts misuse the 
term “jurisdictional.” 
The history and meaning of the term “jurisdictional” continue to 
create questions for courts and commentators with respect to proce-
dural requirements at the crucial transfer of the case from the district 
court to the court of appeals.8  The history of the term’s use provides 
insight into its changing meaning, eventually expanding beyond “that 
imposed by the legislature.”  The federal courts have incorrectly used 
the term “jurisdictional” to abstain from deciding how to address the 
                                                          
3 Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). 
4 United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960). 
5 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 64, 67 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/ 
2007/24/LRColl2007n24Burch.pdf (“The majority’s decision [in Bowles v. Russell, 127 
S. Ct. 2360 (2007),] to label the judge’s miscalculation as jurisdictional means that eq-
uity cannot enter the equation at all.”). 
6 See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. 2360. 
7 See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988).  The Court 
reached this result notwithstanding the fact that “et al.” is commonly used by courts 
and in trial pleadings.  It argued that the result was “imposed by the legislature and not 
by the judicial process.”  Id. (quoting Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986)). 
8 See E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart:
Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 187-205 (2007) (finding 
that historical practice requires courts to find such deadlines jurisdictional); see also
Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 400-18  
(1986) (discussing the use of the term “jurisdictional” and deadlines for filing notice 
of appeal). 
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inequitable situations that arise from strictly enforced litigation rules.  
The courts, in essence, have confused doctrines of abstention with 
doctrines of jurisdiction to avoid expanding equity’s reach into the 
area of post-trial motions and notices of appeal.9
The nature of time limits that restrict the federal courts’ power to 
entertain certain matters lies at the source of the confusion of jurisdic-
tion and abstention.  These time limits generally include the deadlines 
for filing post-trial motions and notices of appeal.10  The purpose of 
these deadlines—helping to facilitate the transfer of the case from the 
trial court to the appellate court—tempts courts to deem them juris-
dictional.  This transfer of power cannot properly be the rationale for 
deeming requirements jurisdictional, however, because jurisdictional 
requirements are not Platonic forms awaiting discovery, but limitations 
expressly set by Congress on the courts’ power to adjudicate claims.11
The tension between the supposed “jurisdictional significance” of post-
trial deadlines and the fact that the modern deadlines are fixed by rule 
rather than statute has forced courts to blur the definition of “jurisdic-
tional.”  Despite the Court’s attempts to clearly define the term,12 it 
continues to be used to mask judicial policy decisions instead of repre-
senting congressional restrictions on, or grants of, power. 
                                                          
9 See Burch, supra note 5, at 67-69 (decrying the lack of equity in federal appellate 
practice).
10 The rules that courts most often deem “jurisdictional” are those with deadlines a 
court cannot extend under the timing provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 
and its analogs in the other rules:  Bankruptcy Rule 9006, Criminal Rule 45, and Ap-
pellate Rule 26.  Appellate Rule 4 contains one of the most important of these dead-
lines:  the deadline to file notices of appeal, which oust the lower court of jurisdiction 
over the case.  See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) 
(“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers 
jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over 
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”).  Other deadlines commonly termed 
“jurisdictional” are the deadlines applying to a renewed motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law under Civil Rule 50(b) and (d), a motion for amending findings under Civil 
Rule 52(b), a motion for a new trial under Civil Rule 59(b) and (d), a motion to alter 
or amend a judgment under Civil Rule 59(e), and a motion for relief from judgment 
under Civil Rule 60(b) and (c).  See, e.g., Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pen-
sion Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994) (deeming Civil Rule 59(e)’s deadline 
jurisdictional because, under Civil Rule 6, the deadline cannot be extended). 
11 See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (noting that only Congress can 
set the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
12 See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (per curiam) (finding that 
the deadlines in Criminal Rule 45 are nonjurisdictional); Kontrick, 540 U.S at 452-56 
(declaring that the limitations on extending the deadlines in Bankruptcy Rule 9006 
are nonjurisdictional). 
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The Supreme Court’s recent foray into the use of the term “juris-
dictional” for such post-trial deadlines13 comes much closer to a 
proper definition, but it fails to account for the role of rulemaking fol-
lowing the passage of the Rules Enabling Act.14  Most of the key provi-
sions governing post-trial motions15 and notices of appeal16 are con-
tained either entirely in the rules or in a mixture of rules and 
statutes.17  By using the term “jurisdictional” to describe both the post-
trial and notice-of-appeal deadlines, the Supreme Court has at times 
removed key issues of finality from the ambit of both the courts and, 
arguably, the rules committees,18 creating a vacuum of authority and 
unnecessarily rigid requirements.  Congress, having already delegated 
the power to promulgate rules of procedure to the rulemakers, has 
shown little interest in filling this gap and has not independently al-
tered the post-trial-motion and notice-of-appeal requirements for civil 
actions since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act.19  The Court’s ef-
forts, however, have ignored this basic fact. 
                                                          
13 See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).  The Supreme Court recently 
avoided the issue of whether filing notices of appeal for a cross-appeal in a criminal 
case, which would be governed by Appellate Rule 4(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3731, is juris-
dictional by finding that the “cross-appeal rule” was “inveterate and certain” whatever 
its status.  Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008). 
14 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–
2077 (2006)).   
15 The timing provisions for each post-trial motion are contained in the respective 
rules, with limitations on extensions contained in analogs to Civil Rule 6.  See supra
note 10.  
16 See FED. R. APP. P. 4. 
17 Specifically, some but not all parts of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 
are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2107.  See infra Part III.A-B. 
18 See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2367 (“If rigorous rules like the one applied today are 
thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that ex-
cuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”).  The Civil Rules themselves make 
clear that they do not alter subject matter jurisdiction.  See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3141 
(2d ed. 1997) (discussing Civil Rule 82’s limitation on altering subject matter jurisdic-
tion).  The rulemakers likely cannot alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts because 
such action would be beyond their power to promulgate only procedural rules and 
would violate the prohibition on abridging, enlarging, or modifying any substantive 
right.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2006); infra text accompanying notes 210-225.  The 
second limitation—on affecting substantive rights—is likely surplusage.  See Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1107 (1982) (“In the 
opinion of the draftsman, as indicated in his correspondence, the second sentence 
served only to emphasize a restriction inherent in the use of the word ‘procedure’ in 
the first sentence.”). 
19 Congress codified part of the deadlines for filing notices of appeal in civil cases, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 2107, but it did so at the request of the Rules Committee.  Congress did 
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This Comment argues that the Court has removed an important 
part of procedure from the control of both the rulemakers and courts 
by deeming certain litigation deadlines “jurisdictional.”  In so doing, it 
has contradicted the intent of Congress in passing the Rules Enabling 
Act.  The combination of a presumption that a requirement is non-
jurisdictional with an extension of principles of equity into the area of 
post-trial motions and notices of appeal would allow for a more just 
procedure for challenging a judgment.  Allowing equitable exceptions 
while still deferring to the rulemakers on broader issues of policy 
would restore the approach that the Supreme Court took following 
the passage of the Rules Enabling Act yet maintain some fairness for 
litigants.20  Part I of this Comment contends that the term “jurisdic-
tional” originated to refer only to grants of, or limitations on, the fed-
eral courts’ power to adjudicate claims passed by Congress.  Part I.A 
summarizes the pre–Rules Enabling Act cases that defined the impact 
of labeling a requirement “jurisdictional.”  Part I.B.1 examines the 
adoption and early amendment of the Civil Rules and finds that the 
rulemakers themselves did not have a clear definition of the limita-
tions on their own power, particularly their ability to alter jurisdic-
tional limitations.  Part I.B.2 argues that the definition of the term “ju-
risdictional” became ambiguous as requirements traditionally set by 
statute were contained in rules and made subject to equitable excep-
tions.  Part I.B.3 recounts the Court’s efforts to restore the definition 
of the term “jurisdictional” to a congressional limitation on federal 
courts’ adjudicatory power.  Part I.B.4 contends that the recent case of 
Bowles v. Russell 21 expresses a definition of “jurisdictional” that mirrors 
that of the pre–Rules Enabling Act cases but that applies the term to a 
system of court-created rules and corresponding statutes with unnec-
essarily harsh results for litigants. 
Part II argues that although the Court now defines the term “ju-
risdictional” to correspond to the pre–Rules Enabling Act conception 
and provides analytical clarity to the term’s meaning, the Court erro-
neously applies a presumption that statutory time limits are jurisdic-
tional.  By adopting such a presumption, the Court limits the ability of 
the rulemakers and Congress to collaboratively develop rules of pro-
cedure.  This Part also argues that between the Rules Enabling Act 
                                                                                                                               
act independently in creating the time limit to file notices of appeal by the government 
in criminal cases, however.  See infra note 93. 
20 For example, in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 226-30 (1960), the Court 
labeled the deadline to file notices of appeal in a criminal matter “jurisdictional,” but it 
did so because it wanted to leave policy questions to rulemakers. 
21 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
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and Bowles, the Court properly recognized the collaborative origin of 
the post-trial deadlines but improperly labeled them jurisdictional. 
Part III summarizes the current status of many post-trial or notice-
of-appeal deadlines and describes the confusing and arbitrary distinc-
tions that undercut the Court’s attempt to clarify when a deadline is 
jurisdictional.  It also argues that the Court’s approach in Bowles, if 
taken to its logical conclusion, could result in invalidation of a provi-
sion in Appellate Rule 4(a) providing an extension of the deadline to 
cross-appeal in civil cases and a provision in Appellate Rule 5 govern-
ing permissive appeals because the provisions could violate the limita-
tions of the Rules Enabling Act. 
Part IV recommends solutions to clarify the status of post-trial and 
notice-of-appeal deadlines.  The Court should find statutory deadlines 
nonjurisdictional by default unless Congress clearly intended other-
wise, as it has for other statutory requirements.  In addition, Congress 
should repeal a statute that merely codifies the provisions of Appellate 
Rule 4 because it creates confusion about the jurisdictional status of 
Rule 4 and about the possibility of altering the provisions through the 
rulemaking process. 
In order to remedy the confusion, the rules committees should 
clarify the result of failing to meet the deadlines that are exempted 
from waiver by courts under Civil Rule 6 and its analogs in the other 
federal rules.  The timing provisions of the federal rules should be 
amended to codify an important but limited equitable exception:  the 
doctrine of unique circumstances, which excuses errors caused by re-
liance on a judge’s statements.  The rulemakers should adopt a ver-
sion of the doctrine that allows litigants to rely on the statements of 
federal judges and allows judges the discretion needed to provide 
fairness to litigants. 
I. HISTORICAL USE OF “JURISDICTIONAL”: A CIRCULAR TRAVEL
The deadlines for notices of appeal and post-trial motions have 
historically, though often erroneously, been labeled “jurisdictional.”  
Commentators have used this long unbroken practice as a justification 
for arguing that the failure to fulfill the requirements to file a notice 
of appeal limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction.22  Commentators and 
                                                          
22 See Poor, supra note 8, at 187-205 (arguing that historical practice supports label-
ing the requirements of notices of appeal “jurisdictional”); see also Hall, supra note 8, at 
400-18 (discussing the historical use of “jurisdictional” for notices of appeal and con-
cluding that the requirements involve something akin to personal jurisdiction). 
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courts have failed, however, to recognize the effect that the Rules 
Enabling Act had in both altering the division of authority between 
the federal courts and Congress and in introducing greater equity and 
fairness to the procedural rules of the federal courts.  The use of the 
term “jurisdictional” to describe requirements of post-trial motions 
and notices of appeal, and particularly deadlines for filing these, has 
been supported by different rationales over time—originally statutory 
codification, then abstention in favor of the rulemakers, and finally 
respecting deadlines contained in statutes.  Only the Supreme Court’s 
pre-1934 rationale and its most recent decisions have properly used 
“jurisdictional” to refer to a congressional grant of or limitation on 
the power of the federal courts.  Following the passage of the Rules 
Enabling Act, the Court used the term “jurisdictional” to emphasize 
the mandatory nature of the deadline at issue while abstaining from 
making policy decisions that it wanted to leave to the rulemaking 
process.  In its most recent cases, however, the Court has fashioned a 
consistent definition of the term “jurisdictional” but misapplied the 
strict label to an area of the federal rules that requires flexible coop-
eration between the courts and Congress. 
A.  Pre–Rules Enabling Act Jurisdictional Decisions 
Deadlines to file notices of appeal were first labeled “jurisdic-
tional” during the Taney Court’s attempts to impose congressional 
supremacy over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.23  The Court’s 
use of “jurisdictional” in United States v. Curry24 presaged a larger 
movement to clarify that Article III did not grant the federal courts ju-
risdiction without a further congressional grant.25  At issue in Curry was 
whether the United States took a timely appeal from the district court 
to the Supreme Court.26  The district court erroneously looked to state 
                                                          
23 Roger Taney was Chief Justice from 1836 to 1864, and his term is associated with 
furthering the idea that federal courts’ jurisdiction is subject to congressional regula-
tion.  See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:  Early Imple-
mentation of and Departures From the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1589-93 
(1986).  There was, however, precedent requiring an affirmative jurisdictional grant 
from Congress for inferior federal courts and for allowing Congress to create excep-
tions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  See Durousseau v. United States, 
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313-14 (1810) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s ju-
risdiction is “limited and regulated by the judicial act”). 
24 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106 (1848). 
25 See Clinton, supra note 23, at 1589-93 (examining the Taney Court’s withdrawal 
from the Court’s previous position of mandatory federal court jurisdiction). 
26 Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 110-12. 
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practice for taking an appeal instead of the specific congressional act 
governing the type of land claim at issue.27  This error resulted in the 
lower court’s authorizing the government to take the appeal beyond 
the one-year period allotted by Congress.28
In keeping with that broader purpose of furthering legislative su-
premacy, the Court found that the statutory nature of the deadline 
prevented the district court from allowing an extension.  Chief Justice 
Taney, writing for the Court, stated what would shape the effect of 
placing the “jurisdictional” label on a requirement: 
The power to hear and determine a case like this is conferred upon the 
court by acts of Congress, and the same authority which gives the juris-
diction has pointed out the manner in which the case shall be brought 
before us; and we have no power to dispense with any of these provi-
sions, nor to change or modify them.
29
Curry announced the principle, which would be echoed in later 
Supreme Court cases, that courts have no power to create equitable 
exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.  The Court, however, pro-
vided little guidance on how to find that a statutory requirement lim-
ited the federal court’s power to hear a case or on when a require-
ment allowed for equitable exception.  In Curry, the limitation on 
taking an appeal was contained in an arguably jurisdictional provision 
that granted federal courts the power to hear that class of cases,30 but 
later courts would not require that the requirement at issue be tied to 
a grant of jurisdiction, only that it be statutory.31
A line of cases after Curry, many stemming from the group of land-
claims statutes at issue in that case, gave shape to the definition of the 
term “jurisdictional.”  The Court followed Curry by emphasizing that 
equitable principles do not allow courts to excuse a late appeal even if 
the lower court clearly caused the delay,32 that a party cannot waive or 
                                                          
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 113.   
30 The same provision both authorized the appeal (thereby granting jurisdiction) 
and set a limit of one year on taking the appeal.  See id. at 107 (noting, with added em-
phasis, the Act’s requirement that “in all cases the party against whom the judgment or 
decree of said District Court may be finally given shall be entitled to an appeal, within 
one year from the time of its rendition, to the Supreme Court of the United States, the 
decision of which court shall be final and conclusive between the parties” (quoting Act 
of May 26, 1824, ch. 95, § 2, 42 Stat. 52, 53)). 
31 See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2368 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“Congress put no jurisdictional tag on the time limit here.”). 
32 See Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 387, 389 (1852) (“For this court has 
never deemed the tribunals of the United States authorized to dispense with the ex-
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forfeit the issue of failure to meet a jurisdictional deadline,33 and that 
the court must address its jurisdiction sua sponte.34  The Court also 
deemed nondeadline requirements, such as a pre-appeal certification, 
to be jurisdictional.35
The pre–Rules Enabling Act cases gave birth to the phrase that 
courts would repeat ad nauseam when describing post-trial deadlines 
and deadlines for notices of appeal:  “mandatory and jurisdictional.”36
The Court also first addressed the impact of court-made rules on post-
trial motions and notice-of-appeal deadlines by allowing a court-made 
rule to toll the congressionally created jurisdictional time limit.37  The 
rise of court rules, however, would limit the usefulness of the label 
“jurisdictional.”  With the passage of the Rules Enabling Act and a 
shift in the requirements at issue from statutes to rules, Curry’s origi-
nal concept that “jurisdictional” referred to the source of the re-
quirement—i.e., Congress—became lost. 
B. Post–Rules Enabling Act Cases:  “Jurisdictional” Loses Its Meaning 
The Rules Enabling Act made it difficult for courts to determine 
which requirements that must be met once litigation has com-
menced.38  Rules, instead of statutes, began to govern the transfer of 
cases from the district courts to the courts of appeals.  As shown in 
Curry, courts viewed the requirements for an appeal as jurisdictional 
prior to the Rules Enabling Act.  The requirements could not prop-
erly be jurisdictional under Curry following their replacement by court 
rules, however, because only Congress may set jurisdictional limita-
                                                                                                                               
press provisions of the acts of Congress regulating appeals and writs of error, upon any 
equitable ground.”). 
33 See United States v. Porche, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 426, 432 (1852) (“But if he had, 
in express terms, waived it, and entered his waiver on the record, it would not have 
given jurisdiction to the court, when the act of Congress had not conferred it.”). 
34 See Poor, supra note 8, at 188 & nn.28-33 (citing Credit Co. v. Ark. Cent. Ry. Co., 
128 U.S. 258 (1888); Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 306 (1869)). 
35 See Hewitt v. Filbert, 116 U.S. 142, 145 (1885) (finding that failure to obtain certi-
fication to file an appeal was jurisdictional, but allowing the requirement to be waived). 
36 See Hall, supra note 8, at 410 (citing Vaughn v. Am. Ins. Co., 15 F.2d 526 (5th 
Cir. 1926)). 
37 See Morse v. United States, 270 U.S. 151, 153-54 (1926) (“There is no doubt un-
der the decisions and practice in this court that where a motion for a new trial in a 
court of law, or a petition for a rehearing in a court of equity, is duly and seasonably 
filed, it suspends the running of the time for taking a writ of error or an appeal, and 
that the time within which the proceeding to review must be initiated begins from the 
date of the denial of either the motion or petition.”). 
38 For a discussion of the Rules Enabling Act in light of its legislative history, see 
generally Burbank, supra note 18.  
2008] Jurisdiction and the Federal Rules 289
tions.39  Furthermore, the authority of the rulemakers to alter jurisdic-
tional limits set by Congress remains questionable, because it could 
violate the Rules Enabling Act’s requirement that the rulemakers 
promulgate only rules of procedure.40  The early rulemakers appeared 
to have no set conception of the limitations on their power,41 creating 
confusion over whether the new rules for taking an appeal or chal-
lenging a judgment by post-trial motion were jurisdictional. 
1.  The Original Rulemakers Lacked a Clear Conception of the  
Term “Jurisdictional” and Its Impact on Their Authority 
The two provisions of the Rules Enabling Act that are most rele-
vant to determining the impact of the Act on the term “jurisdictional” 
for matters regulated by the federal rules are the grant of power to the 
Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules42 and the supersession 
clause.43  The delegation of power to the Supreme Court to promul-
gate rules of procedure allows for the creation of the modern re-
quirements for post-trial motions and notices of appeal.  It also, how-
ever, arguably prevents the rulemakers from altering the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction.44  The supersession clause allows the rulemakers 
to impose uniformity by clearing conflicting statutes,45 implying that 
the rulemakers had the power to alter some existing statutory 
schemes.  The fact that Congress allows supersession of statutes, how-
ever, is arguably in some tension with the Court’s precedent declaring  
                                                          
39 Congress, however, has explicitly delegated the power to alter the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction beyond the delegation in the Rules Enabling Act in specific in-
stances.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006) (allowing the rules to authorize interlocu-
tory appeals). 
40 See id. § 2072(a); see also infra notes 193-208 and accompanying text (arguing that 
the Rules Enabling Act’s delegation of power does not include altering jurisdictional 
statutes). 
41 See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1132-37 (describing how the early rulemaking 
committees did not give much consideration to the meaning of the substance-
procedure distinction). 
42 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).  
43 Id. § 2072(b). 
44 See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2367 (2007) (“If rigorous rules like the one 
applied today are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to prom-
ulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”).  There was also 
some concern that amending the time limit for filing notices of appeal might be be-
yond the rulemakers’ power.  See infra text accompanying note 76. 
45 See Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks:  A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Sub-
stance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1043-45 (de-
scribing the supersession clause’s purpose as facilitating “brush-clearing” of the nu-
merous procedural statutes required before the federal rules). 
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that “the same authority which gives the jurisdiction has pointed out 
the manner in which the case shall be brought before us; and we have 
no power to dispense with any of these provisions, nor to change or 
modify them.”46  Unfortunately, the original rulemakers did not 
squarely address whether they could alter or create jurisdictional limi-
tations or supersede jurisdictional statutes. 
The most important creation of the original civil rules for the 
purposes of determining the jurisdictional status of post-trial and no-
tice-of-appeal deadlines was Civil Rule 6, which allowed for the relaxa-
tion of any deadline in the rules except those specified therein.47  The 
original Civil Rule 6, formed at the creation of the Civil Rules, allowed 
for an extension of time by motion before a deadline had passed or 
for good cause after failing to meet a deadline, but it exempted any 
action under Civil Rule 59, which then included motions for a new 
trial and motions to alter or amend the judgment.48  The rulemakers 
meant to replace the traditional notion that a court’s power over a 
case ended at the end of the term of court with a uniform time limit 
for all cases that could not be extended.49  It was through this provi-
sion disallowing expansion of the time limits in Civil Rule 59 that the 
pre–Rules Enabling Act jurisdictional precedents crossed over to a 
litigation landscape shaped by a division of power different from the 
concept of legislative supremacy envisioned by the Taney Court.50
                                                          
46 United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113 (1848).   
47 Civil Rule 6 has been described as “[t]he Grandparent of Modern Jurisdictional 
Deadlines.”  Poor, supra note 8, at 190.  Former Civil Rule 73, which eventually set the 
deadline to file notices of appeal, did not alter the statutory deadline until the 1946 
amendments. Compare FED R. CIV. P. 73 (1938) (repealed 1968), H.R. DOC. NO. 75-460, 
at 87-90 (1938), with FED. R. CIV. P. 73 (1946) (repealed 1968), H.R. DOC. NO. 80-473, 
at 1 (1947).
48 See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1, 78 (1946) [hereinafter 1946 REPORT] (giving the text of the original 
rules and the proposed changes that would become the 1946 amendments to the Civil 
Rules).  The ability of courts to extend the time was based on the text of Equity Rule 8, 
which allowed a judge to extend the time for performance.  See 4B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1161 n.3 (3d ed. 
2002) (providing the relevant text of Equity Rule 8).  The prohibition on extending 
specified periods, however, did not originate from any of the Equity Rules.  See id.
§ 1161 (specifying other areas of Rule 6 that were based on the Equity Rules but not 
the prohibition on extending time for actions under Rule 59). 
49 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (“The 
amendment of Rule 6(b) now proposed is based on the view that there should be a 
definite point where it can be said a judgment is final . . . .”). 
50 See Poor, supra note 8, at 191 (“Almost a century of precedent upholding juris-
dictional deadlines readily crossed over to the deadlines identified by Rule 6(b).”). 
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The civil rulemakers themselves encouraged use of the term “ju-
risdictional” for noncongressionally created rules during the discus-
sion of the 1946 amendments to the Civil Rules and corresponding 
Judicial Code and Judiciary Act of 194851 by using Rule 6 to restrict the 
power of the district court to alter judgments.  These changes were 
enacted in the Judicial Code and Judiciary Act of 194852 and the 1946 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,53 creating the 
modern “event of jurisdictional significance,”54 the transfer of a case 
from the district court to the court of appeals.  The requirements for 
this transfer have since beguiled courts seeking to determine why and 
how the event has jurisdictional significance.  The 1946 amendments 
expanded the list of deadlines in Civil Rule 6 that could not be ex-
tended by the court by listing the time limits for several rules other 
than Civil Rule 59, most importantly the deadlines for filing a notice 
of appeal55 in former Civil Rule 73.56  Former Civil Rule 73 governed 
the method for taking an appeal but at first left the deadline as pre-
scribed by Congress.57  The 1946 amendments to former Civil Rule 73 
created deadlines of thirty days to file notices of appeal in a civil ac-
tion, unless federal law prescribed a shorter time to appeal, and sixty 
days if the federal government was a party, with an extension for fail-
ure to learn of the judgment by excusable neglect.58  This was shorter 
than the period then set by Congress. 
                                                          
51 Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 963. 
52 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869. 
53 H.R. DOC. NO. 80-473 (1947). 
54 Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). 
55 The filing of the notice of appeal has several important consequences for the 
respective powers of the district court and court of appeals.  It has been viewed as 
granting the court of appeals power to hear the case.  See id.
56 The deadlines then listed as inalterable by the courts were Civil Rules 25, 50(b), 
52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), and 73(a) and (g).  See 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 48, § 1161.  The 1946 amendments to Rule 6 and the amendment to former Rule 
73(a) adding a time limit were considered together, and both were listed as proposed 
amendments in 1946.  See 1946 REPORT, supra note 48, at 1, 90. 
57 See FED. R. CIV. P. 73 (1938) (repealed 1968), H.R. DOC. NO. 75-460, at 87-90 
(1938)(“When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of 
appeals and within the time prescribed, a party may appeal from a judgment by filing 
with the district court a notice of appeal.”).  The quoted language was removed in the 
1946 amendment. 
58 See 12 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 18, § 3062 n.1 (providing the text 
of former Rule 73 after the 1946 amendments).  Prior to the amendment, the time 
limit to appeal for many cases was within three months from entry of judgment.  See,
e.g., Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, § 8(c), 43 Stat. 936, 940.  
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The motivation behind the 1946 amendments appears to have 
been the peculiar case of Hill v. Hawes.59  In Hill, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether Rule 10 of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit allowed a district court judge to vacate a previous judg-
ment and enter a new judgment in order to reopen the time to file an 
appeal.60  Because Congress had not included the D.C. Circuit within 
the act that set the time to appeal at three months from the entry of 
judgment,61 a previous act of Congress allowed the D.C. Circuit to set 
the deadline by court rule.62  D.C. Circuit Rule 10 set the deadline at 
twenty days.63  Hill missed the deadline to appeal because he had failed 
to receive notice of the judgment as required by then–Rule 77 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.64  The D.C. Circuit rejected the ar-
gument that failure to receive notice should allow the district court to 
vacate and reenter the judgment, but the Supreme Court reversed.65
The Supreme Court’s ruling disturbed the Advisory Committee.  
First, although stating that the district court could not extend the time 
under the Rule, the Supreme Court praised the “sound discretion” of 
the district court in reentering judgment so that notice could be given 
in compliance with the federal rules.66  This statement contravened 
the Committee’s specific decision to preserve the statutory require-
ment that the deadline for notice of appeal run from entry of judg-
ment instead of receipt of notice of the judgment.67  The Committee 
may have hesitated to alter the statutory scheme by changing the 
event that triggered the deadline from entry of judgment to receipt of 
notice because the statute that stated that the deadline started to run 
                                                          
59 320 U.S. 520 (1944).  Following the decision, the Advisory Committee on Rules 
for Civil Procedure extensively discussed the opinion and questioned how to overrule 
several aspects of it through amendment of the Civil Rules.  ADVISORY COMM. ON 
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1 PROCEEDINGS 2-81 (1944) [hereinafter 1944 MINUTES],
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1944-04-Civil-Minutes.pdf. 
60 Hill, 320 U.S. at 520-23. 
61 Act of Feb. 13, 1925 § 128. 
62 See Hill, 320 U.S. at 522-23. 
63 Id. at 521. 
64 Id. at 521-22.
65 Id. at 523. 
66 Id. at 524. 
67 The April 1944 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 
involved the discussion of a letter from William Mitchell, Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee for both the creation of the Civil Rules and the 1946 amendments, to Chief 
Justice Stone asking the Court to grant rehearing of the Hill case because it gave this ef-
fect to then–Rule 77, which the rulemakers had meant to avoid.  See 1944 MINUTES, supra
note 59, at 61-71 (providing the text of the letter and Chief Justice Stone’s response).  
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from entry of judgment68 set the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.69
The method of reentering judgment to reopen the time to appeal also 
created concerns that the judgment never would become final if the 
district court could simply reenter judgment to avoid the limitation on 
its granting a late post-trial motion or allowing a late appeal.70  This 
reentry of judgment frustrated the Committee’s attempts to bring fi-
nality to judgments through a clear and uniform system of rules. 
The Court also mentioned at the end of the opinion that because 
the term of court had not expired, “the judgment was still within con-
trol of the trial judge.”71  This statement contradicted the Committee’s 
continued attempts to replace the old system of providing finality, 
which relied on formal terms of court and gave the district court the 
power to order a new trial or otherwise affect the judgment only until 
the end of its term.72  The Committee created Civil Rule 6 to eliminate 
terms of court and to prevent courts from extending the period in 
which they could hear motions challenging the judgment, “lest judg-
ments never can be said to be final.”73
The Advisory Committee’s minutes indicate that the Hill v. Hawes
decision led to two proposals, both of which became part of the 1946 
amendments to the Civil Rules.  The Hill decision made clear to the 
Committee that judgments would never properly be final without fur-
                                                          
68 Note that in Hill, however, the D.C. Circuit’s rules set the time to appeal, so 
there would be no conflict between the federal rules and a statute.  320 U.S. at 521. 
69 According to Chairman Mitchell, the Advisory Committee had been wary of al-
tering the statute that set the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.  1944 MINUTES, su-
pra note 59, at 62. 
70 Id. at 11-12.  The Committee seemed worried that defeated litigants could appeal 
to judges’ sympathies and that district court judges would easily grant reentry.  Id. at 27. 
71 Hill, 320 U.S. at 524; see also 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 62. 
72 See 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 18.  The Advisory Committee’s note to the 
1946 amendment of Civil Rule 6(b) explains why the old approach was disfavored:   
The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the finality of judgments.  Prior to 
the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule that a 
court loses jurisdiction to disturb its judgments, upon the expiration of the 
term at which they were entered, had long been the classic device which (to-
gether with the statutory limits on the time for appeal) gave finality to judg-
ments. . . . Rule 6(c) abrogates that limit on judicial power.  That limit was 
open to many objections, one of them being inequality of operation because, 
under it, the time for vacating a judgment rendered early in a term was much 
longer than for a judgment rendered near the end of the term.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
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ther guidance to courts from the Rules.74  The new amendments fur-
ther defined when a district court’s power to alter a judgment ended 
by expanding the list of post-trial motions with deadlines that courts 
could not extend in Rule 6(b).75
The other change was the 1946 amendment to former Rule 73 
that reduced the time to appeal to thirty days from the entry of judg-
ment, with an extension for failure to learn of the judgment because 
of excusable neglect.  This reduction might have pushed beyond the 
rulemakers’ power had they worked alone and not asked for conform-
ing statutory changes from Congress.76  In response to Hill, the 
Chairman of the Advisory Committee, William Mitchell, first proposed 
shortening the time to appeal to thirty days while having the time run 
from receipt of formal notice of the judgment, instead of entry of 
judgment.77  The Committee appears to have rejected the idea of run-
ning the time to appeal from receipt of notice,78 but several members 
complained about the overly long time to appeal that was available at 
that time.79  The Rules Committee then set out to change the deadline 
to file notices of appeal. 
                                                          
74 The text of the Advisory Committee’s notes explains the reason for the 1946 
amendments to Rule 6: 
The amendment of Rule 6(b) now proposed is based on the view that there 
should be a definite point where it can be said a judgment is final; that the 
right method of dealing with the problem is to list in Rule 6(b) the various 
other rules whose time limits may not be set aside, and then, if the time limit 
in any of those other rules is too short, to amend that other rule to give a 
longer time.  The further argument is that Rule 6(c) abolished the long stand-
ing device to produce finality in judgments through expiration of the term, 
and since that limitation on the jurisdiction of courts to set aside their own 
judgments has been removed by Rule 6(c), some other limitation must be 
substituted or judgments never can be said to be final.  
Id.
75 See id. (explaining why each addition to Rule 6(b) justified not allowing exten-
sion of time). 
76 Chairman Mitchell, while proposing the change, also questioned if the rule-
makers had the power to alter the time to appeal through the rulemaking process.  See
1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 4 (“The other alternative is to assume that the Court 
has the power to make rules affecting the time for appeal . . . .”).  The original rule-
makers appear not to have had a clear conception of the limitations on their power.  
See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1132-37. 
77 See 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 4.  The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges 
had also proposed shortening the time.  See id. at 71-72. 
78 The proposal adopted by the Committee and contained in the 1946 Report 
started the thirty-day limit for filing notice of appeal from entry of judgment.  1946 RE-
PORT, supra note 48, at 90. 
79 See 1946 REPORT, supra note 48, at 90 (proposing that Rule 73 be amended to 
include a thirty-day limit); 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 71-72 (noting that the Act-
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The history clearly indicates that the rulemakers guided the revi-
sions to the deadline to appeal, despite some coordination with Con-
gress over the statutory changes.  As early as June 24, 1946, the legisla-
tive history of the Judicial Code and Judiciary Act of 1948 indicates 
that the reduction of the time to appeal to thirty days80 was done “in 
conformity with recommendations of members of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States and proposed amendment to rule 73.”81
The amended rules also took effect six months before § 2107 and the 
Judicial Code and Judiciary Act were effective.82  The rulemakers’ early 
drafts made no mention of a statutory change,83 but the legislative his-
tory of the statute mentions that the rule amendments had already 
been proposed.  The history supports the claim that the rulemakers 
were primarily responsible for shortening the time to file notice of 
appeal.
Although the rulemakers sought legislative changes, their actions 
are inconclusive regarding whether they thought they had the author-
ity to make changes to jurisdictional requirements.  Original Civil 
Rule 6(c) swept away the term-of-court system,84 which the rulemakers 
themselves referred to as affecting a court’s jurisdiction.85  The rule-
                                                                                                                               
ing Chairman and the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges felt that three months was 
too long).  There had been some objection by the Attorney General to shortening the 
time, and the objection may explain the longer time allowed when the United States is 
a party.  See id. at 71-72.  The possibility that the Attorney General’s objection spurred 
the extension of the time to appeal if the government is a party is supported by the 
notes to proposals contained in the 1946 report of the Committee.  See 1946 REPORT,
supra note 48, at 93-94 (detailing the reasons that the government requires additional 
time).
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006).
81 H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A174 (1947).  Identical language was also included in a 
previous report, H.R. REP. NO. 79-2646, at A166 (1946), corresponding to a prior ver-
sion of the Judicial Code and Judiciary Act.  The Committee Report on the version of 
the Judicial Code and Judiciary Act that was passed contains no explanation of § 2107.  
See S. REP. NO. 80-1559 (1948).   
82 The 1946 amendments were effective March 19, 1948, while the Judicial Code 
and Judiciary Act was not passed until June 25, 1948, and was effective September 1, 
1948.  Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts with Advi-
sory Committee Notes, 8 F.R.D. 591, 601 (1948). 
83 The proposed 1946 amendments make no mention of legislation in support of 
the change. See 1946 REPORT, supra note 48, at 90-98. 
84 Civil Rule 6(c) does not now contain the language of the original rule, eliminat-
ing terms of court, which can be viewed in the earlier reports of the Advisory Commit-
tee. See id. at 1 (providing the then-current text of Rule 6(c)). 
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.  This itself, 
however, may be a loose use of the term “jurisdictional” because the terms-of-court sys-
tem was developed by the courts themselves.  See United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 
67 (1914) (collecting cases supporting the view that “[i]n the absence of statute pro-
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makers were unsure, however, if they could alter the time for filing 
notices of appeal, though not so unsure as to keep the rule from go-
ing into effect before the statute.  Despite ambiguity over the rule-
makers’ authority, it was clearly the rulemakers, and not Congress, 
who drove the creation of a new system for providing finality to judg-
ments and who directed how cases transitioned from the district court 
to the circuit court.86  Unfortunately, the rulemakers, and later the 
courts, failed to examine their authority to create jurisdictional re-
quirements. 
2.  Courts Attempt to Define the Impact of Rule 6 and Its Analogs  
by Blurring the Meaning of “Jurisdictional” 
During the period between the enactment of the Rules Enabling 
Act and the Supreme Court’s attempts to clarify the meaning of “ju-
risdictional” earlier this decade, federal courts used the term impre-
cisely by expanding it to include court-made rules and by allowing eq-
uitable exceptions. 87
                                                                                                                               
viding otherwise, the general principle obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its 
final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered”).  The rule-
makers did not attempt to supersede the statutes that recognized the practice.  See FED.
R. CIV. P. 6(c) advisory committee’s note (“Such statutes as [former 28 U.S.C. § 12] 
(Trials not discontinued by new term) are not affected.”).  Once again, the drafters do 
not appear to have had a clear conception of jurisdiction, and certainly not one as tied 
to legislative supremacy as the Taney Court’s.  See 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 69 
(providing postscript of letter where Chairman Mitchell described the D.C. Circuit 
rule at issue in Hill as setting the court’s jurisdiction). 
86 However, counsel for the United States in John R. Sand & Gravel v. United States
argued that § 2107 should not be viewed as merely a conforming statute because “once 
this matter was brought to its attention, Congress could have enacted whatever statute 
it wanted.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008) (No. 06-1164), 2007 WL 3265512.  Although the point 
clearly applies in determining that § 2107 deserves classification as a congressionally 
passed statute, the argument raises the more important question, discussed infra Part 
4.B.1.a, of the evidence of congressional intent required to show that a statute is juris-
dictional.  If all statutes are jurisdictional by default, then the questions of congres-
sional action and jurisdictional status are the same.  If, however, more evidence of 
congressional intent is needed to find a statute jurisdictional, then Congress’s failure 
to act on its own becomes highly relevant.  “Despite Supreme Court rhetoric to the 
contrary, it would . . . be problematic to assign an intent to Congress with respect to 
Rules promulgated under the Enabling Act.”  Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Dele-
gation:  Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1153 
(2002). A codification based on a suggestion by the Rules Committee similarly does 
not provide strong indication of a legislative intent to create a jurisdictional limitation. 
87 See Hall, supra note 8, at 410 (arguing that the Court often used “jurisdictional” 
only to emphasize the mandatory nature of the deadline).   
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Having found the jurisdictional terms-of-court system replaced by 
the various rules, courts struggled to determine the nature of such lim-
its.  United States v. Robinson88 represents one of the leading cases of the 
post–Rules Enabling Act era that holds a rule to be jurisdictional.89  At 
issue in Robinson was whether confusion about who was supposed to file 
notice of appeal—counsel to the defendant or the defendant himself—
excused the defendant’s untimely filing.90  The Court relied on the 
unanimous conclusion of the courts of appeals that Civil Rule 6 was ju-
risdictional (because it could not be extended by the courts) to find its 
analog, Criminal Rule 45, jurisdictional as well.91  The Robinson Court 
labeled the deadline for filing notices of appeal in a criminal case 
“mandatory and jurisdictional,”92 preventing extension or excuse even 
though the deadline at issue was contained in a rule and not a statute.93
The conception of “jurisdictional” embodied in Robinson differs 
significantly from that expressed in Curry.  First, it expands the core 
purpose of the Taney Court’s creation of the modern outlines of the 
meaning of “jurisdiction”—legislative supremacy over the power of Ar-
ticle III courts—to include court-made rules.  Second, the government 
in Robinson objected to the late appeal,94 so the only issue was whether 
the rule was mandatory, preventing an equitable exception.  The issue 
was not whether the rule was truly jurisdictional in the sense that the 
court would have an obligation to examine the deadline sua sponte.95
Third, the Court provided a rationale different from that of legislative 
supremacy to support the use of “jurisdictional”:  abstention to the 
                                                          
88 361 U.S. 220 (1960). 
89 See Poor, supra note 8, at 194 (“Of the myriad decisions holding various crimi-
nal, appellate, and bankruptcy decisions to be jurisdictional, a great many trace their 
origin to a 1960 decision of the Supreme Court, United States v. Robinson.”). 
90 361 U.S. at 220-21. 
91 Id. at 228-29. 
92 Id. at 224. 
93 At the time of Robinson, Criminal Rule 37(a)(2) contained the deadline for fil-
ing notices of appeal in criminal cases.  Id.  The provision indicating which deadlines 
in the Criminal Rules could not be extended by the court was and still is contained in 
Criminal Rule 45, an analog of Civil Rule 6.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b).  Appellate Rule 
4(b) currently contains the deadline and certain extensions for filing notices of appeal 
in criminal cases, and it has only been codified with respect to appeals by the United 
States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006).  For appeals by the defendant, there remains a 
cross-reference in the United States Code to the abrogated Criminal Rule 37.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3732 (2006). 
94 Robinson, 361 U.S. at 221. 
95 Cf. Hall, supra note 8, at 410.  “Mandatory” refers to the fact that the district 
court could not alter or waive the time limits, even if they were nonjurisdictional (pro-
vided a party objected), but the term does not necessarily require the court to take up 
the issue sua sponte.
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rulemakers.  The Robinson Court recognized that “powerful policy ar-
guments may be made both for and against greater flexibility” and ab-
stained from deciding the policy questions regarding finality because 
the rulemakers were better situated to outline comprehensively the 
boundaries of any exception.96  The thrust of Robinson was not that the 
courts could not act,97 but merely that it would be imprudent for them 
to do so. 
Based on the Court’s rationale, and in light of the strict legislative-
supremacy view of the Taney Court, Robinson only stands for an em-
phatic abstention by the Court to the rulemakers and a command to 
the lower court to abstain as well.98  The Robinson Court’s rationale re-
lied heavily on leaving issues of policy to the rulemakers out of pru-
                                                          
96 Robinson, 361 U.S. at 229-30. 
97 Robinson does state that “[w]hatever may be the proper resolution of the policy 
question involved, it was beyond the power of the Court of Appeals to resolve it.”  Id. at 
230.  The Court could have been referring to “power” as meaning (1) jurisdiction, (2) 
that the rule did not allow any exceptions, or (3) that the courts of appeals lack the 
institutional capacity to determine the policy issues correctly.  Given that the Court 
would allow equitable exceptions to the nonextendable federal rules three years later, 
the last reading is the most consistent with both the unique-circumstances and Robin-
son line of cases. 
98 The doctrine of abstention to state and federal administrative agencies are very 
similar.  The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows for the referral of important ques-
tions to a federal agency if Congress granted the agency authority over the issue, the 
agency’s specialization will help properly determine the issue, and referral will foster 
uniformity.  See Bryson Santaguida, The Primary Jurisdiction Two-Step, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1517, 1521-25 (2007).  However, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the case.  Id.
The Burford abstention doctrine for unclear state law involving administrative proce-
dures allows a court to avoid disuniformity by dismissing in favor of determination by a 
state agency.  In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the Court affirmed the dis-
trict court’s use of abstention when faced with an issue involving Texas’s administrative 
regulation of oil wells.  The Court wanted to avoid destroying the uniform state regula-
tory system.  “As a practical matter, the federal courts can make small contribution to 
the well organized system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide.”  
Id. at 327.   
 Like Burford abstention, the use of “jurisdictional” left an administrative agency (or 
state court) as the only recourse to clarify the rule.  See Gordon G. Young, Federal Court 
Abstention and State Administrative Law from Buford to Ankenbrandt:  Fifty Years of Judicial 
Federalism Under Buford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 
870 (1993) (“Unlike Pullman abstention, Burford abstention is generally understood to 
entail a federal court’s outright dismissal of the case before it . . . .”).  The use of “ju-
risdictional” for post-trial and notice-of-appeal deadlines, however, differs from absten-
tion because it leaves the litigant with no avenue to have her claims heard, because a 
subsequent change in the federal rules could not rescue the litigant from dismissal.  
An abstention from creating exceptions to the federal rules may have been the moti-
vating force behind the Court’s use of “jurisdictional.”  See Robinson, 361 U.S. at 229-30 
(finding the deadline to file notice of appeal jurisdictional because the rulemakers 
were better positioned to address the issues of policy involved). 
2008] Jurisdiction and the Federal Rules 299
dential concerns.99  The lower federal courts and subsequent Supreme 
Court opinions, however, did not interpret Robinson as an abstention. 
The Robinson Court shaped what would be the prevailing view un-
til recent attempts to clean up the meaning of “jurisdictional.”  Every 
circuit held that the deadlines of Civil Rule 6, Criminal Rule 45,100 Ap-
pellate Rule 26,101 and Bankruptcy Rule 9006102 were “mandatory and 
jurisdictional.”  Other than the time to appeal in a civil case in current 
Appellate Rule 4(a)103 and the time for the government to appeal in a 
criminal case under Appellate Rule 4(b),104 however, none of the ju-
risdictional deadlines was statutory. 
The Court further diluted the meaning of “jurisdictional” by al-
lowing certain equitable exceptions to these jurisdictional deadlines.  
In Harris Truck Lines v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., the Court ruled that it 
could excuse the untimeliness of a notice of appeal because the appel-
lant relied on the district court’s impermissible extension of the dead-
line to file notice of appeal.105  The Court found that “unique circum-
stances” would excuse noncompliance, such as when the judge misled 
                                                          
99
As the Kontrick Court explained,  
Courts, including this Court, it is true, have been less than meticulous in this 
regard; they have more than occasionally used the term “jurisdictional” to de-
scribe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court. . . . For example we have 
described Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), on time enlargement, and 
correspondingly Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b), on extending 
time, as “mandatory and jurisdictional.”  
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (quoting Robinson, 361 U.S. at 228-29). 
100 See Poor, supra note 8, at 196 n.91 (collecting cases in which the courts have 
held that the deadlines established by Criminal Rule 45 are jurisdictional). 
101 See id. at 198 n.108 (collecting cases in which the courts have held that dead-
lines established by Appellate Rule 26 are jurisdictional). 
102 See id. at 199 n.113, 201 n.125 (collecting cases in which the courts have held 
that the deadlines established by Bankruptcy Rule 9006 are jurisdictional). 
103 The rulemakers moved the deadline to file notices of appeal from former Civil 
Rule 73 to Appellate Rule 4 with the creation of the Appellate Rules in 1966.  See FED.
R. APP. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to 1967 amendment (“This subdivision is de-
rived from [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 73(a).”).  The statute still partially corre-
sponds to the current Rule.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006). 
104 This rule is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006). 
105 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962) (per curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 
2360, 2366 (2007); see also Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964) (per curiam) 
(excusing late-filed notice of appeal and motions under Rule 52 and Rule 59 because, 
before the deadline had passed, the district court erroneously granted the litigant an 
extension for excusable neglect), overruled by Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366; Wolfsohn v. 
Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 203 (1964) (per curiam) (excusing the late filing of a Rule 59 
motion and notice of appeal because the district court erroneously gave an extension 
based on excusable neglect), rev’g 321 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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or confused litigants.106  In Harris Truck Lines, the Court failed to no-
tice that the doctrine of unique circumstances contrasts directly with 
Curry, where the Supreme Court did not allow a late appeal even 
though the litigants relied on an erroneous deadline set by the district 
court.107  Until recently, the conflict created by allowing an equitable 
exception to a supposedly jurisdictional requirement escaped the 
Court’s notice.108
C. Cleaning Up the Meaning by Reclaiming the Congressional Origins 
The definitional shift discussed above led the Court to try to clean 
up the meaning of “jurisdictional,” starting with Kontrick v. Ryan in 
2004.  Noting that only Congress can set the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the federal courts,109 the Court differentiated between “a rule gov-
erning subject matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing 
rule.”110  Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded by acts that 
the parties take during litigation, the Court explained, and it only re-
fers to classes of cases falling within a court’s authority.111  In contrast, 
claim-processing rules, which are strictly enforced rules governing 
deadlines once litigation has commenced, could be forfeited by the 
parties.112  The Court then applied this distinction to find that the time 
limitation in Bankruptcy Rule 4004, which governs time to file for dis-
charge of debt, and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(3), which prevents a 
court from extending Rule 4004’s time limit except by the terms of the 
rule, were nonjurisdictional and that Kontrick had forfeited any time-
liness objection to Ryan’s motion by not raising it earlier.113
In making the distinction between limits on subject matter juris-
diction and claim-processing rules, the Court appeared to define sub-
ject matter jurisdiction as only describing the appropriate classes of 
                                                          
106 See generally Philip A. Pucillo, Timeliness, Equity, and Federal Appellate Jurisdiction:  
Reclaiming the “Unique Circumstances” Doctrine, 82 TUL. L. REV. 693, 701-09 (2007) (de-
scribing the history and status of the doctrine of unique circumstances before Bowles).
107 See United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 110-13 (1848). 
108 Some lower court judges did notice, however, including then-Judge Alito.  See
United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (“I would note that both the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized an 
equitable exception to Rule 59.  This ‘unique circumstances’ exception . . . shows that 
Rule 59's strictures do not implicate Article III subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
109 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004). 
110 Id. at 456. 
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 455-56. 
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cases that the federal courts could or could not hear.  In dicta, how-
ever, the Kontrick Court differentiated the provision at issue in that 
case from express statutory deadlines.114  By so distinguishing the case, 
the Court allowed for a later move toward a conception of jurisdiction 
similar to that used by the Taney Court:  that statutory requirements, 
particularly deadlines, are generally to be understood as jurisdictional, 
rather than only upon a clear statement of Congress. 
Following Kontrick, the proper scope of the term “jurisdictional” 
remained an open question.  The limitation on extending certain 
deadlines contained in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(3) is substantially 
the same as other timing provisions of the federal rules based on Civil 
Rule 6.115  The Court’s definitional refinement threatened what lower 
courts readily accepted after the creation of the federal rules:  that the 
rules’ limits on courts were jurisdictional. 
The Court followed Kontrick with a unanimous opinion in Eberhart v. 
United States that further questioned the jurisdictional status of the fed-
eral rules.116  Noting that the Court’s “repetition of the phrase ‘manda-
tory and jurisdictional’ has understandably led the lower courts to err 
on the side of caution by giving the limitations in [Criminal] Rules 33 
and 45 the force of subject-matter jurisdiction,”  the Court held that the 
time limits, which cannot be extended under Criminal Rule 45, were 
nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules.117  The Court implied to the 
reticent courts of appeals that few if any of the federal rules were still to 
be considered jurisdictional by noting that “[Criminal] Rule 45(b)(2) 
has precisely the same effect on extensions of time under Rule 29 as it 
does under Rule 33, and as we noted in Kontrick, Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 45(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) are both ‘modeled 
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b).’”118
Two other cases seemed to complete the transformation of the 
term “jurisdictional” that began with Kontrick.  In Scarborough v. Prin-
cipi, the Court ruled that the time limit to file for attorneys’ fees under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act119 did not concern the classes of cases 
                                                          
114 Id. at 453 & n.8.  The Kontrick court expressly listed § 2107(a) as an example of 
a statutory deadline contained in a power-conferring statute.  Id.
115 Bankruptcy Rule 9006 is an analog to Civil Rule 6, Criminal Rule 45 and Appel-
late Rule 26, all of which determine when the timing provisions of the prospective 
rules can be excused or altered by the court.  See supra note 10 (identifying the types of 
rules that courts most often define as jurisdictional). 
116 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). 
117 Id. at 19. 
118 Id. (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456 n.10). 
119 Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). 
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that the lower court could hear, and thus could not be jurisdic-
tional.120  In a detailed opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court again 
visited the issue in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. in the context of whether 
an employee-numerosity requirement under Title VII was jurisdic-
tional.121  In probably the most well-reasoned opinion since the Court 
first took up the issues in Curry, the Court in Arbaugh applied a default 
rule that statutory requirements were nonjurisdictional unless Con-
gress clearly indicated otherwise because Congress did not place the 
numerosity requirement in the section authorizing courts to hear 
claims under Title VII.122
D.  Statutes Begin to Dominate the Rules 
Despite the clarity of Kontrick and Eberhart, the Court’s attempt to 
clean up the meaning of “jurisdictional” has taken a rather unex-
pected turn.  In Bowles v. Russell,123 the Court seized on the statutory-
deadlines distinction of Kontrick, while differentiating statutory dead-
lines from nondeadline requirements such as the one at issue in Ar-
baugh.  The Court applied a presumption of jurisdictionality for statu-
tory deadlines instead of the presumption of nonjurisdictionality for 
nondeadline statutory requirements.124
The Court’s decision to apply such a presumption had rather 
harsh results.  Keith Bowles failed to receive notice of the judgment 
                                                          
120 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004). 
121 546 U.S. 500, 510-13 (2006). 
122 See id. at 515-16 (“[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on cov-
erage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in char-
acter.”).
123 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364-65 (2007) (stating that while time limits are generally ju-
risdictional, neither time limits in a court’s procedural rules nor employee-numerosity 
requirements are). For further discussion of the Bowles Court’s reasoning and other 
implications of the decision, see The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 315, 315-25 (2007). 
124 The Court stated, “[ j]urisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes 
good sense.  Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal 
courts have jurisdiction to consider.”  Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365.  Statutes of limitations, 
however, still have an opposite rebuttable presumption of nonjurisdictionality and 
availability of equitable tolling—although it may not apply in a specific case such as the 
statute of limitations in the Court of Claims statute.  See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2008) (noting that the Court had replaced an ad 
hoc approach to determining whether statutes of limitations on claims against the gov-
ernment were jurisdictional with the rebuttable presumption of nonjurisdictionality 
used for claims between private parties); see also Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153-154 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (discussing Bowles and John R. Sand & Gravel and finding that the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) 
(2006), is still subject to equitable exceptions). 
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against him in his habeas petition in federal district court.125  He then 
moved to reopen the time to file notice of appeal for fourteen days 
pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).126  When reopening the time to 
file notice of appeal, however, the district court had erroneously given 
Bowles seventeen days instead of the fourteen days prescribed by rule, 
and Bowles filed his notice of appeal on the sixteenth day in reliance 
on the judge’s order.127
Despite the clear reliance on the judge’s order, the Court refused 
to allow Bowles’s appeal.  The Court cited precedent, including Curry,
to find that “taking an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘manda-
tory and jurisdictional.’”128  In breaking from the reduced use of “ju-
risdictional” for rules that started in Kontrick and Eberhart, the Court 
distinguished Rule 4(a) based on the existence of a corresponding 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107.129  The Court, however, ignored or was un-
aware of the fact that the rulemakers created the exact same deadlines 
before Congress passed a conforming statute.130  The Court viewed 
                                                          
125 Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
126 Id.  Rule 4(a)(6) allows a party to move to reopen the time to appeal if she 
does so within 180 days of the judgment or within seven days of receiving notice, 
whichever is earlier.  The provision was added in the 1991 amendment to Rule 4.  See
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) advisory committee’s note & transmittal note to 1991 amend-
ment (explaining the reason for the new provision and asking Congress to amend 28 
U.S.C. § 2107 to conform to the changes).  Congress did subsequently amend § 2107.  
See Act of Dec. 9, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 12, 105 Stat. 1623, 1627.  Congress 
adopted almost identical language for § 2107 to account both for the previous 
amendments to Rule 4(a)(5), which allows for an extension of time to appeal for ex-
cusable neglect or good cause, and the then-pending extension for failure to receive 
notice, Rule 4(a)(6).  H.R. REP. NO. 102-322, at 10 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1303, 1309-10.  The amendment was meant to avoid socially wasteful 
litigation over whether the statute or rule would govern.  Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1305-06. 
127 Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
128 Id. at 2363-64 (collecting cases). 
129 See id. at 2364. 
130 Id. at 2366.  The Court appears to have relied heavily on the Solicitor General’s 
brief for the conclusion that the statutory codification prevented the deadline for no-
tice of appeal from being a claim-processing rule.  See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10-11, Bowles, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (No. 06-5306), 
2007 WL 608162 (arguing that the Court has routinely held congressionally set dead-
lines for filing appeals to be jurisdictional).  According to Justice Ginsburg, however, 
the Court failed to realize that § 2107 conformed to the rules, and that the timing re-
quirements were originally not statute driven: 
But, of course, Bowles—I mean the Court did miss something.  Everyone on 
the Court did, and that is that the period to file your notice of appeal was 
originally not in any statute.  It was in the rule, the FRAP rule.  The opinions, 
both sides, assumed that the statute came first, and the rule was adopted to 
conform to the statute, but in fact it was just the opposite.  It was a rule, a Fed-
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§ 2107 as specifically limiting subject matter jurisdiction, similarly to 
how it views 28 U.S.C. § 2101, which limits the time for petitioning the 
Supreme Court for certiorari.131  The fact that the deadline was also 
contained in a statute was sufficient for the Court to find it jurisdic-
tional, despite the lack of any indication that Congress intended the 
deadline to be jurisdictional. 
After erroneously finding the statute to be jurisdictional based on 
Curry, the Court wisely rejected the idea that a truly jurisdictional limit 
could be subject to equitable exceptions based on the same case law.132
The Court overruled Harris Truck Lines and its progeny, which author-
ized the use of the doctrine of unique circumstances to the extent that 
it would allow equitable exceptions to jurisdictional limits.133
After almost four decades of consistent holdings that contained an 
underlying doctrinal fuzziness, the Court made strides in clarifying 
the meaning of “jurisdictional” in Kontrick, Eberhart, and Bowles, de-
spite some missteps in when to apply the term.  Less than a year after 
Bowles, however, the Court has described that decision in a manner 
that appears to back away from the Curry -Bowles meaning and once 
again muddles the definition of the term.134  Writing for the Court in 
John R. Sand & Gravel Co., Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter—
both dissenters in Bowles—described Bowles’s use of “jurisdictional” 
not as a principled stand but as “convenient shorthand.”135  The Court 
stated that its use of the term was not meant to indicate a limitation 
set by Congress, but “to achieve a broader system-related goal” of 
“promoting judicial efficiency.”136  Although the discussion of Bowles
was limited, the Court’s revisionist treatment has again cast doubt on 
what was once a clear conception of “jurisdictional” as a congressional 
                                                                                                                               
eral Rule of Civil Procedure, which can’t affect jurisdiction.  We know that.  As 
Congress says[,] rules of procedure don’t affect jurisdiction.   
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. 
Ct. 750 (2008) (No. 06-1164), 2007 WL 3265512. 
131 Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365. 
132 Id. at 2366. 
133 Id.
134 This may have been because the deadline at issue in Bowles was not originally 
set by statute, as the Court seemed to assume.  See supra notes 129-130.  In backing off 
the original reasoning of Bowles, but not its holding, the Court risks further undoing 
the clarifying attempts of Kontrick and Eberhart.  The Supreme Court recently furthered 
the revisionist history of Bowles by relying on “institutional interests” and other vague 
interests embodied in the federal rules.  Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 
2565, 2577 (2008).  
135 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (2008). 
136 Id.
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limitation.  In a limited discussion, John R. Sand & Gravel restored the 
logic of Robinson:  jurisdictional limitations can include limitations 
based on courts’ views of when to make or not make policy decisions. 
The Court recently implied that it might give no more help in de-
termining which of the many contradictory statements on “jurisdic-
tion” lower courts should follow.  In Greenlaw v. United States, the dis-
trict court erroneously sentenced Greenlaw to less than the statutory 
mandatory minimum.137  On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Greenlaw 
argued that his sentence was unreasonably high.138  The government 
noted in its brief that the district court erroneously set the sentence 
below the mandatory minimum, but it did not file a notice of cross-
appeal to have the sentence enhanced.139  The time for the govern-
ment to file a cross-appeal is regulated by both the Appellate Rules 
and a statute.140  The Supreme Court found that the requirement of 
filing a cross-notice of appeal to seek alteration of the judgment re-
mained “inveterate and certain” and that federal courts should not 
correct unnoticed errors for the government, but the Court did not 
decide whether the requirement was jurisdictional in addition to be-
ing mandatory.141  The Court relied heavily on the fact that Congress 
had required that “high-ranking officials within the Department of 
Justice” authorize an appeal on behalf of the government but failed to 
address § 3731’s requirements.142
The Court’s opinion, like John R. Sand & Gravel, echoes Robinson;
the Court explained that “[t]he strict time limits on notices of appeal 
and cross-appeal would be undermined”143 but failed to address the 
scope of the rules and the rulemakers’ authority to determine if there 
was an actual conflict between the rule and the potential exception.  If 
the Court erred in Bowles by not realizing that the rulemakers spurred 
the passage of the time limits for civil cases, the Court seems to have 
made an opposite mistake in Greenlaw.  It cited the issue of finality 
with the rules, but the rules for appeals by the United States govern-
ment in a criminal case originated from Congress through a statute; it 
                                                          
137 Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2562-63. 
138 Id. at 2563. 
139 Id.
140 The statute gives the government thirty days to file notices of appeal for certain 
sentencing errors.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3731, 3742 (2006).  The rule mirrors the statute.  FED.
R. APP. P. 4(b).  Neither mentions an extension for cross-appeals. 
141 Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2564 (quoting Morley Constr. Co. v. Md. Casualty Co., 
300 U.S. 185, 191 (1937)). 
142 Id. at 2565. 
143 Id. at 2569. 
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was not the rulemakers whose concerns of finality were the provision’s 
motivation.  Thus, the Court ascribed an intent to the rulemakers 
without considering the intent of Congress, which first created the 
provision. 
The Court, having found the cross-appeal rule mandatory, “de-
clined to decide ‘the theoretical status’ of the cross-appeal rule” 
while recognizing that past opinions “contain statements supporting 
both characterizations.”144  The status may not be simply theoretical, 
however, as it goes to the authority of the rulemakers, particularly 
when, as with § 3731 and Rule 4(b), a statute corresponds with the 
rule.  If the cross-appeal rule is only mandatory, the rulemakers can 
alter it.  If it is mandatory and jurisdictional, then only Congress can 
alter it. 
Although the Court avoided deciding whether lower courts had 
jurisdiction by making the rule “inveterate and certain,” the issue of 
the rulemakers’ authority in the face of potential jurisdictional limi-
tations is not merely “theoretical.”  The jurisdictional status of rules 
directly relates to the authority of the actors who help to create the 
rules of procedure in federal courts.  Only Congress, and neither the 
rulemakers nor the federal courts, can create or modify jurisdic-
tional requirements absent a specific delegation of that power from 
Congress.  The Court’s failure to address the issue, after John R. Sand 
& Gravel created confusion about Bowles’s holding, leaves important 
questions open to debate.  The Greenlaw decision itself fails to ad-
dress the authority for its holding, invoking, without clearly relying 
on, tradition and historical practice, a statute requiring Department 
of Justice officials’ consent, and the deadlines in the federal rules.145
It remains unclear, however, who can change the requirement for a 
cross-appeal:  only Congress, the rulemakers in addition to Congress, 
or the Court in its adjudicatory role?  The Court appears to be de-
termining how strictly to enforce the cross-appeal rule through its 
own authority, but it has failed to clarify this question despite several 
opinions in the last five years.  Addressing this question requires that 
the system of providing finality to judgments be examined and re-
formed. 
                                                          
144 Id. at 2565. 
145 Id. at 2565-66, 2568-69. 
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II. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT CALLS INTO QUESTION WHETHER 
POST-TRIAL-MOTION AND NOTICE-OF-APPEAL
REQUIREMENTS ARE TRULY JURISDICTIONAL
The Court struggled to determine the role of post-trial and notice-
of-appeal deadlines after court rules became the primary means of 
guiding conduct during litigation because the reasoning of the tradi-
tional approach did not transfer to the post–Rules Enabling Act period.  
Each period brought with it clarification of the role of such deadlines, 
but also missteps in identifying the meaning of “jurisdictional” and the 
authority on which the Court’s decisions rested.  An analysis of these 
cases should go beyond merely citing the unbroken line of decisions 
calling such requirements “jurisdictional”146 because the conception of 
jurisdiction used in different periods clearly varies widely. 
The original rulemakers likely viewed the system before the Rules 
Enabling Act as an inflexible jurisdictional system.  They wanted to 
replace it with a more sensible but probably equally inflexible sys-
tem.147  The few statements of the rulemakers at the time, however, did 
not clearly define the exact form that finality should take, other than 
preventing a judge from allowing untimely motions merely out of 
sympathy.148  The courts had to determine what the rulemakers meant 
to accomplish with the creation of Civil Rule 6. 
The immediate post–Rules Enabling Act cases embodied by Robin-
son and its progeny clearly identified the federal rules as the source of 
authority over the system for filing post-trial motions and notices of 
appeal after the Rules Enabling Act.  The Court also clearly thought 
that the rulemakers were better positioned than courts—which are 
limited to deciding individual cases—to make the policy choices in-
volved in granting more flexibility when the exception could be com-
monly found.  In repeatedly using the phrase “mandatory and juris-
dictional,” the pre-Kontrick cases should be interpreted to mean only 
                                                          
146 The history of using “jurisdictional” to label such requirements has often been 
cited to support the proposition that such requirements are clearly jurisdictional.  See
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007) (“This Court has long held that the tak-
ing of an appeal is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”); Griggs v. Provident Consumer 
Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (“It is well settled that the requirement of a timely 
notice of appeal is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’”); Poor, supra note 8, at 182-86 
(making a historical argument for continuing to find such requirements jurisdictional 
even in light of Kontrick and Eberhart).
147 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
148 See id.
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that the requirements are mandatory149 and that courts should abstain 
from making policy choices better left to the rulemakers.150  The 
Court’s approach had little to do with the conception of jurisdiction 
before the Rules Enabling Act—that of legislative control.  Most of the 
notable pre-Bowles cases do not cite to a statute as the source of the 
deadline for notice of appeal, even if one existed.151  The Court in this 
period also allowed equitable tolling of the time to appeal that went 
beyond the Court’s previous holding in Curry, which focused on con-
gressionally created restrictions. 
The clarifying period after Kontrick partially erased the misstep of 
Robinson by returning to the Taney Court’s definition—legislative en-
actment—and by restoring a concrete meaning to the term “jurisdic-
tional.”  The Court, however, confused the issue of authority by creat-
ing its own solution of “claim-processing rules” to determine the status 
of a late filing, rather than looking to the history of the rules’ timing 
provisions and the rulemakers’ intent. 
The most recent attempt in Bowles relies heavily on the idea of leg-
islative supremacy, embodied in Curry and Kontrick, which held that 
only Congress may alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts.152  The 
Bowles Court, however, relied on an idea of statutory supremacy over 
court opinions or rules that was developed before the Rules Enabling 
Act.  It failed to question whether the use of such a hierarchy for 
deadlines created or altered through the rulemaking process remains 
true to the intent of Congress.  Congress has largely delegated power 
to the rulemakers in this area, and it has generally only adopted cor-
responding legislation at the request of the rulemakers.153
                                                          
149 See Hall, supra note 8, at 410 (arguing that the Court only means “mandatory” 
when it has called rules “mandatory and jurisdictional”).  
150 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (commenting that courts classify rules 
as jurisdictional in order to abstain from altering a rule). 
151 See Griggs, 459 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Appellate Rule 4, and not 28 U.S.C. § 2107, 
for the deadline to file notices of appeal); see also Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 
U.S. 312, 315-16 (1988) (citing only Appellate Rules 3 and 4).  But see Browder v. Dir., 
Dept. of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (mentioning § 2107 once in combination with 
Rule 4, but in the remainder of the opinion citing only Rule 4).  A search on Lexis for 
cases citing Appellate Rule 4(a) after 1947 (the year before 28 U.S.C. § 2107 was 
passed) and before 2008 resulted in 2558 decisions, compared to only 303 citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2107. 
152 This is only true absent a specific delegation of the power.  Cf., e.g., 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(e) (2006) (allowing the federal rules to authorize interlocutory appeals). 
153 This is not true for 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006), which sets the time for the United 
States to file notices of appeal in criminal cases.  See supra note 93. 
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Through all periods after the Rules Enabling Act, the Court has in 
some fashion perpetuated the idea that some requirements are inher-
ently jurisdictional, whether because they affect finality,154 because of 
the transfer of the case between trial and appellate court,155 or because 
timing deadlines are inherently more inflexible than other require-
ments.156  However difficult to surmount, a sensible conception of ju-
risdiction must eliminate the Platonic form or Aristotelian logic157 of 
jurisdictional requirements and focus solely on congressional intent. 
III. CURRENT STATUS OF POST-TRIAL DEADLINES AND 
THE DEADLINE FOR NOTICES OF APPEAL
The Supreme Court’s attempts to clarify the jurisdictional status of 
post-trial motions and notice-of-appeal deadlines have left the issue 
muddled.  Although the practice of labeling all deadlines listed in 
Rule 6 and its analogs in other federal rules may have required a con-
fused meaning of “jurisdictional,”158 it did have the benefit of creating 
consistency across all deadlines involving finality.  The currently simi-
lar requirements may or may not be jurisdictional based largely on 
historical accident—whether or not the rulemakers decided to ask for 
a corresponding statutory change—and the status of many require-
ments is still questionable. 
Without further action by Congress and the rulemakers, the cur-
rent issues will result in much socially wasteful litigation regarding the 
intent of Congress in passing legislation in areas where the Court, act-
ing as rulemaker, also has rulemaking power.  Additionally, there will 
be supersession clause issues and general confusion about the status 
of post-trial and appellate deadlines. 
Based on current Supreme Court holdings, the deadlines con-
tained in Bankruptcy Rule 9006159 and Criminal Rule 45160 are not ju-
                                                          
154 See United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 228-30 (1960) (“[O]therwise, . . . 
many appeals might—almost surely would—be indefinitely delayed.”). 
155 Griggs, 459 U.S. at 59-60. 
156 Compare Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 -65 (2007) (finding a deadline 
jurisdictional), with Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 -15 (2006) (finding a 
nondeadline requirement nonjurisdictional). 
157 See Hall, supra note 8, at 412. 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 94 -97. 
159 See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-56 (2004). 
160 See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (per curiam).  There may, 
however, be an exception to the criminal rules’ not being jurisdictional.  The statute 
governing modification of a criminal sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2006), incorporates 
Criminal Rule 35, which limits the district courts’ ability to correct sentences.  Two cir-
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risdictional but rather claim-processing rules that may be untimely 
filed if the opposing party fails to object.  Most deadlines for filing no-
tices of appeal in civil cases and the exceptions for excusable neglect 
and failure to receive notice in Appellate Rule 4(a) are jurisdictional 
because they are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2107.161  The Court, however, 
has left in doubt the jurisdictional status of the other deadlines of Ap-
pellate Rule 4 and the deadlines in Civil Rule 6(b). 
A.  Notice of Appeal in Criminal Cases 
Under Supreme Court precedent, Criminal Rule 4(b), governing 
time for defendants to file notices of appeal in criminal cases, likely is 
not jurisdictional.  The deadlines in Rule 4(b) for the United States in 
a criminal case, in contrast, do have a corresponding statute and so 
likely would be found jurisdictional. 
The Court has questioned the holding of Robinson, which found 
the prohibition on extending the deadline for defendants to file no-
tices of appeal in criminal cases to be jurisdictional.162  The Court has 
also praised Schact v. United States, which found the Supreme Court 
rule limiting the time to file petitions for certiorari in a criminal case 
to be nonjurisdictional.163  If the Supreme Court were to consider the 
jurisdictionality of Appellate Rule 4(b), based on its current prece-
dent, it should conclude that the deadline for defendants to file no-
tices of appeal in criminal cases does not affect a court’s jurisdiction, 
but is instead a claim-processing rule.164  Because the Supreme Court 
has not expressly overruled Robinson, however, the circuit courts will 
                                                                                                                               
cuits have found Rule 35 jurisdictional.  See United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 82-85 
(1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Higgs, 504 F.3d 456, 464 (3d Cir. 2007). 
161 See Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2364-65 (holding that statutory time limits are jurisdic-
tional).  As discussed above, the rationale of Bowles has been weakened by subsequent 
cases, so even its clear holding is in jeopardy. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136. 
162 See supra note 99; see also Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17 (“Robinson is correct not because 
the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, but because district courts must observe 
the clear limits of the Rules of Criminal Procedure when they are properly invoked.”). 
163 398 U.S. at 63-64; see also Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365; Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454. 
164 See Philip A. Pucillo, Jurisdictional Prescriptions, Nonjurisdictional Processing Rules, 
and Federal Appellate Practice:  The Implications of Kontrick, Eberhart, & Bowles, 59 RUT-
GERS L. REV. 847, 869-71 (2007) (concluding that the ten-day limit for defendants to 
file a notice of appeal was not jurisdictional).  But see Poor, supra note 8, at 215-17 (ar-
guing that Appellate Rule 4 and Civil Rule 6(b) are still jurisdictional following Kon-
trick and Eberhart).
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likely be somewhat reluctant to find the deadlines to be nonjurisdic-
tional claim-processing rules.165
In contrast to the time to appeal for criminal defendants, the 
thirty-day time limit on filing notices of appeal for the United States is 
codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  If one applies the Bowles default of find-
ing statutory deadlines to be jurisdictional, § 3731 should require that 
courts treat the deadline as jurisdictional for the United States166 even 
though nothing in the legislative history necessarily supports such a 
finding.167
B. Notice of Appeal in Civil Cases and Post-Trial 
 Motions that Toll the Deadline 
Two issues remaining unclear after Bowles arise out of inconsisten-
cies between Rule 4(a) and § 2107.  First, § 2107 does not contain a 
provision tolling the time to appeal for certain timely post-trial mo-
tions.168  This discrepancy necessarily raises the question whether the 
deadlines for the motions that toll the time to file notices of appeal 
are themselves jurisdictional.  Second, Appellate Rule 4(a)(3) allows 
an extra fourteen days to file notices of appeal if another party has 
                                                          
165 At least four circuits have relied on Bowles to determine that Rule 4(b) as ap-
plied to criminal defendants is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.  See United 
States v. Byfield, 522 F.3d 400, 403 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 
229, 231-34 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Garduno, 506 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2007).  One circuit has 
found that Rule 4(b) is nonjurisdictional based on Eberhart. See United States v. Sadler, 
480 F.3d 932, 941-42 (9th Cir. 2007).  Other circuits have questioned whether Rule 
4(b) remains jurisdictional after Kontrick and Eberhart but have not been willing to 
overrule long-held precedent.  See Poor, supra note 8, at 218 n.243 (collecting cases). 
166 In finding Rule 4(b) to be a claim-processing rule, the Tenth Circuit specifically 
limited its holding to appeals from the defendant in criminal trials.  Garduno, 506 F.3d 
at 1290-91. 
167 See Pucillo, supra note 164, at 868 n.152 (“[N]othing in the legislative history 
suggests that the rule was meant to be jurisdictional in nature.”).  The fact that long-
standing practice requires statutory authorization for the government to appeal and 
that § 3731 provides such authorization, however, supports its being jurisdictional. See, 
e.g., United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
Congress meant to eliminate all statutory bars on the government’s ability to appeal in 
criminal cases in § 3731 and thus that the statute should be read as granting a court 
jurisdiction to hear a broad range of government appeals).  Even without Bowles’s pre-
sumption of jurisdictionality, § 3731 may still be jurisdictional based on the context in 
which it was passed. 
168 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006) with FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).  Post-trial motions for 
which there is no provision in § 2107 tolling the time for appeal are Civil Rules 50(b), 
52(b), 59(b) and (d), 60(b) and (c) (if filed within ten days), and a motion for attor-
neys’ fees under Rule 54, if the court extends the time to appeal under Rule 58.  FED.
R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). 
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filed notice, but § 2107 does not contain a similar provision.169  This 
implicates the limits on making procedural rules and the supersession 
clause of the Rules Enabling Act.170
Court rules that toll the time to appeal for post-trial motions pre-
date the Rules Enabling Act and § 2107,171 and so the absence of the 
provision in § 2107 likely does not implicate the supersession clause of 
the Rules Enabling Act or the rulemakers’ questionable authority to 
supersede a jurisdictional statute.172 This was the prevailing practice at 
the time of § 2107’s passage with respect to earlier statutory limits on 
notice of appeal, and Congress’s failure to repudiate the practice 
could be seen as acceptance of the practice.173  In addition, because 
post-trial motions listed in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) disturb finality, toll-
ing the time to appeal should, as with other rules defining finality, be 
viewed not as jurisdictional but merely as affecting a prerequisite to 
appellate jurisdiction:  finality of judgment.174
                                                          
169 Compare § 2107 with FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3).
170 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
171 Morse v. United States provides a clear example:   
There is no doubt under the decisions and practice in this court that where a 
motion for a new trial in a court of law, or a petition for a rehearing in a court 
of equity, is duly and seasonably filed, it suspends the running of the time for 
taking a writ of error or an appeal, and that the time within which the pro-
ceeding to review must be initiated begins from the date of the denial of ei-
ther the motion or petition. 
270 U.S. 151, 153 (1926); see also Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 
203, 205 (1943) (finding that court rules tolled the time to appeal). 
172 This Comment uses the term “tolling” to designate the restarting of the time to 
file notices of appeal, which runs from the entry of the last post-trial motion listed in 
Rule 4(a)(4)—popularly referred to as a tolling provision.  See, e.g., Wilburn v. Robin-
son, 480 F.3d 1140, 1146 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing Rule 4(a)(4) as concerning 
“appellate tolling”).  It is not properly a tolling provision, however, in that the period 
before the motion does not count, which will impact the effect of “claim-processing 
rules” combined with the provision.  If a post-trial motion is timely for purposes of 
Rule 4, then it would completely restart the time to file notices of appeal and not 
merely toll the time to file such notices. 
173 At least one circuit has had to determine whether part of the tolling provision 
was jurisdictional.  See Wilburn, 480 F.3d at 1146 n.11 (ruling, before Bowles, that even if 
§ 2107 was jurisdictional, the tolling provision that applies to Civil Rule 60(b) motions, 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), was a claim-processing rule).  
174 For example, the requirement of entry of a final judgment as a separate docu-
ment in the docket, which starts the time to appeal, is nonjurisdictional despite its im-
pacting the timeliness of a notice of appeal.  See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 
381, 383 (1978) (“We conclude that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was 
correct in deciding that it had jurisdiction in this case despite the absence of a separate 
judgment.”).
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There is a counterargument, however, that the tolling provision 
and deadlines for post-trial motions listed in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) 
are jurisdictional.  The timeliness of such motions often determines 
whether notice of appeal is timely under Appellate Rule 4(a) and 
§ 2107.  This close relationship could show that the deadlines in the 
respective rules should also be jurisdictional.  At the very least, if the 
opposing counsel fails to object to an untimely post-trial motion, mak-
ing it timely because the deadlines for such motions are claim-
processing rules, it does not necessarily follow that the motion should 
also toll the time to file notice of appeal.  At least some litigants and 
judges have already put forth an argument that, even if a post-trial 
motion’s untimeliness can be excused in hearing the motion, the ex-
cusal does not make that motion timely for purposes of tolling in Rule 
4(a).175  As with the Rule 4(b) issue, courts are split on whether the  
precedent prior to Bowles remains valid.176  Confusion remains over 
whether deadlines for motions that toll the time to appeal are jurisdic-
tional or, even if the deadlines are nonjurisdictional, whether valid 
but technically untimely motions can still toll the time to file notice of 
appeal.
C. Supersession of § 2107 or Invalidity of Appellate Rule 4(a)(3) 
The jurisdictional status of Appellate Rule 4(a)(3), governing 
cross-appeals in civil cases, presents a much more troubling situa-
                                                          
175 See Nat’l Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (re-
jecting the argument); Wilburn, 480 F.3d at 1146 n.11 (rejecting the argument as raised 
by the dissent); see also Pucillo, supra note 164, at 870-73 (arguing that deadlines for 
post-trial motions in Civil Rule 6(b) are nonjurisdictional). 
176 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have found that the deadlines contained in Civil 
Rule 6(b) are nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules.  Dill v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 
525 F.3d 612, 618-19 (8th Cir. 2008); Alexander, 496 F.3d at 475-76.  Before Bowles, the 
Ninth Circuit had similarly concluded that the deadline for a Rule 59 motion for a new 
trial is not jurisdictional.  In re Onecast Media, Inc., 439 F.3d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 2006).  
In light of Bowles, the Ninth Circuit  held that although untimely motions may be en-
tertained, they will not toll the time to appeal, as the tolling provision of Rule 4(a)(1) 
is jurisdictional, and not a claim-processing rule.  United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2008).  The Ninth Circuit appears 
to have taken a similar view by finding jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), which ex-
tends the time to appeal when judgment has not been entered as a separate document, 
even though it is not contained in § 2107.  See Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 
514 F.3d 833, 841-42 (9th Cir. 2007).  Other circuits have not changed their pre-
Kontrick holdings that motions governed by Civil Rule 6(b) are jurisdictional.  See Poor, 
supra note 8, at 220 n.254 (collecting cases holding that Rule 59 is jurisdictional).   
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tion.177  Because Congress has not codified Rule 4(a)(3), it should not 
properly be considered jurisdictional under Bowles.178  Unlike that of 
other deadlines, however, the issue of Rule 4(a)(3) is not whether 
there are equitable exceptions to the provision of the rule, but 
whether the provision itself is valid. 
The circuits are currently split over whether the first notice of ap-
peal provides jurisdiction to hear a cross-appeal179 and over whether 
notice of a cross-appeal represents a nonjurisdictional procedural re-
quirement or a jurisdictional requirement that must be complete be-
fore the court has the power to hear the cross-appeal.180  If the first-
filed notice of appeal provides jurisdiction for later cross-appeals,181
then there is no issue, as Rule 4(a)(3) merely acts as a claim-
                                                          
177 Rule 4(a)(3) provides a fourteen-day extension from the filing of the first no-
tice of appeal to file a notice of cross-appeal. 
178 The courts of appeals have yet to reach this issue after Bowles. See, e.g., Amidon 
v. Student Ass'n of the State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d 94, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(refusing to reach the issue of whether the fourteen-day deadline for cross-appeals is 
jurisdictional because the opposing party’s objection was untimely). 
179 A separate notice of appeal is generally required from any party wishing to alter 
the judgment. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COO-
PER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3904 (2d ed. 1992) (“Many cases state the 
general rule that a cross-appeal is required to support modification of the judgment, 
but that arguments that support the judgment as entered can be made without a cross-
appeal.”).  The three dissenting Justices who reached the issue of jurisdiction in 
Greenlaw, however, would have found the requirement of a cross-appeal to be non-
jurisdictional.  See Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2571-72 (2008) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he cross-appeal rule [is] a rule of appellate practice.”).   
180 The First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Federal Circuits have held that the first 
notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to hear cross-
appeals, but the Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have held that it does.  See Zapata 
Indus., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 34 F. App’x. 688, 690 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2002) (col-
lecting cases); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1298 nn.26-
28 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases); 15A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 179,
§ 3904 n.32 (collecting cases).  The Eleventh Circuit has found, in a nonprecedential 
opinion, that the failure to file a notice of a cross-appeal deprives the court of jurisdic-
tion to hear the cross-appeal.  See Barrington v. Lockheed Martin, U.A.W. Local 788, 
257 F. App’x 153, 155 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007).  The Fourth Circuit, in a nonprecedential 
opinion, stated that the notice of cross-appeal is not a jurisdictional requirement.  See
Babb v. U.S. DEA, 146 F. App’x 614, 621 (4th Cir. 2005). 
181 The Court has determined that notice of appeal by the government in criminal 
cases is required before a court can hear a cross-appeal.  Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2564-66.  
The Court, however, declined to determine if the notice was a jurisdictional require-
ment. Id. Greenlaw’s holding may not apply outside cross-appeals by the government 
in criminal cases.  First, such appeals are governed by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006), 
and the Court relied on the fact that the government must receive approval by senior 
Justice Department officials before it can take an appeal.  Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2565.  
Neither of these would necessarily apply to cross-appeals in civil cases, or cross-appeals 
by criminal defendants. 
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processing rule that does not conflict with § 2107.  If the first-filed no-
tice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction, then filing notice of cross-
appeal provides jurisdiction and would act as an extension of the 
deadline for notice of appeal contained in § 2107.  This result calls 
into question whether Appellate Rule 4(a)(3) represents a valid exer-
cise of rulemaking authority and supersedes § 2107. 
The “procedure” limitation of the Rules Enabling Act likely pre-
vents the rulemakers from altering the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts without further delegation from Congress.182  In Bowles, the 
Court mentioned in passing that Congress would have to authorize 
the rulemakers to change a jurisdictional statute like § 2107.183  If, as a 
majority of the circuits have held, a court’s jurisdiction requires a 
separate notice of appeal, Rule 4(a)(3) may very well violate the “pro-
cedure” limitation on rulemaking power and be invalid. 
Before Bowles, the sloppy use of the term “jurisdictional” for rules 
had not led courts and commentators to question whether the conflict 
between a then-jurisdictional rule and a jurisdictional statute meant 
that the rulemakers had exceeded their authority.184  If a cross-appeal 
requires separate notices of appeal for the court to have jurisdiction, 
§ 2107 directly conflicts with Rule 4(a)(3) because it purports to ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the federal courts.185  Because only Congress 
                                                          
182 See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (“[I]t is 
axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal 
jurisdiction.”). 
183 See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2367 (2007) (“If rigorous rules like the 
one applied today are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to 
promulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”). 
184 Appellate Rule 4(a) has been found to supersede statutes setting a different 
time to appeal than does the rule, including § 2107.  See COMM. ON THE RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (1990) (recommending 
that Congress amend § 2107 because the provision allowing ninety days to appeal in 
admiralty cases conflicted with Rule 4(a)(1), although case law indicated that the rule 
superseded § 2107); see also Cederbaums v. Harris, 484 F. Supp. 125, 127-28 (S.D.N.Y 
1980) (finding that because § 2107 lacked the excusable-neglect provisions of Rule 4, 
Rule 4 superseded § 2107);  Hall, supra note 8, at 412 n.60 (arguing that Rule 4 super-
sedes § 2107 because § 2107 lacks the tolling provision of Rule 4).  However, Professor 
Hall’s suggestion based on the tolling provision fails to recognize both that the statute 
and rule may not conflict on this point, and that the tolling provision came before the 
statute’s passage, preventing invocation of the supersession clause. 
185 Assuming that notice of cross-appeal was a jurisdictional prerequisite, there 
would remain questions whether § 2107 abrogated Rule 4(a)(3) or whether Rule 
4(a)(3) was valid when created.   The rulemakers added the fourteen-day time exten-
sion to former Civil Rule 73(a) for multiple or cross-appeals in 1966, and the addition 
was transferred to Appellate Rule 4(a) with the creation of the Appellate Rules.  See 12 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3062 n.2 (providing the text of former Rule 73 af-
316 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 279
can determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,186
Rule 4(a)(3) would be invalid because it goes beyond the rulemakers’ 
authority.  The lack of any mention of cross-appeals in the 1991 
amendments to § 2107 could be read as an implicit adoption of the 
provision, but it also could be read as a rejection of the proposal by 
failing to adopt the provision while revising § 2107 to conform to 
other provisions of Rule 4(a).187  Congress, like the courts, probably 
did not recognize any conflict because the meaning of the term “ju-
risdictional” remained vague at the time of the amendment.  Because 
§ 2107 is jurisdictional and Rule 4(a)(3) purports to extend the time 
limit of § 2107, however, an argument could be made that Rule 
4(a)(3) is not a valid exercise of the rulemakers’ authority. 
This confusion could be avoided if courts began to interpret 
§ 2107 to require only the first notice of appeal to grant jurisdiction 
over any subsequent cross-appeals, but this reversal of case law in 
many circuits would merely use interpretation to allow the rules to ef-
fectively amend a jurisdictional statute.  The later addition of a notice-
of-cross-appeal provision in the federal rules cannot alter the intent of 
Congress in passing an earlier statute.  The statute was either jurisdic-
tional or not at its creation, and the rulemakers do not have the au-
                                                                                                                               
ter the 1966 amendments); see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) advisory committee’s note to 
1967 amendment (“This subdivision is derived from FRCP 73(a) without any change of 
substance.”).  The sequence of amendments to Rule 4 and § 2107 presents a question 
whether nonsubstantive amendments or amendments to other subsections should de-
termine which comes last in time for purposes of supersession.  Because the Rule 
4(a)(3) provision came after the initial passage of § 2107, it could abrogate § 2107 un-
der the supersession clause, if it were a valid rule.  The amendment of § 2107 in 1991 
that failed to include the provision could be considered the last in time, however. The
sequence is further complicated by the fact that Rule 4(a)(3) was amended in 1993, 
though “no substantive change was intended.”  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) advisory com-
mittee’s note to 1993 amendment.  In most circuits, the last substantive amendment, 
which was made in 1966, would likely govern if it was valid.  See Edward A. Hartnett, 
Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 171-75 (2006).  Under the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach to the supersession clause, however, the intent of the Committee 
would be irrelevant and Rule 4 would still be the last in time.  See id. (commenting on 
the Sixth Circuit’s strict last-in-time approach).  The difference is likely merely seman-
tic because a rule that would supersede a jurisdictional statute is likely invalid in the 
first place, as it goes beyond the rulemakers’ authority. 
186 This limitation is true absent a more specific delegation, such as the delegation 
of the ability to authorize certain interlocutory appeals.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006). 
187 This failure to adopt Rule 4(a)(3) in the § 2107 amendments highlights the diffi-
culty of interpreting inaction by Congress.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legisla-
tive Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 90-103 (1988) (stating that courts have allowed incor-
poration of existing precedent when a statute does not clearly overrule it, but also that 
courts have found significance in the rejection of a specific proposal).  Assuming that 
legislative action can tell us about legislative intent is questionable, however.  Id. at 94.   
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thority to alter the statute’s jurisdictional status after its passage.  Re-
defining the jurisdictionality of the cross-appeal rule to validate the 
rulemakers’ later acts allows them to effectively amend a statute that 
would otherwise be jurisdictional. 
D.  Permissive Appeals and Rule 5 
The effect of Bowles on permissive appeals under Appellate Rule 5 
remains unclear.  If a party must request permission from the court of 
appeals to file an appeal, then Rule 5 applies.  The rule directs that if 
the statute or rule authorizing the appeal does not specify a time to 
file the petition to appeal, then Rule 4’s deadlines apply to the request 
for certification to appeal.188  This rule, however, creates a conflict 
with Bowles.  By the statute’s terms, § 2107’s “jurisdictional” deadline 
applies to all appeals by the statute’s terms and requires that notice of 
appeal be filed within thirty days from the entry of the judgment.189  In 
addition, Rule 5 also purports to allow the district court to amend or-
ders when it must make specific findings, as when such findings are 
needed to permit an interlocutory appeal.190  Arguably, Bowles and 
§ 2107 require that notice of appeal, and not simply request for per-
mission to appeal, be filed within thirty days from judgment, but per-
mission to appeal may not even be granted within thirty days.  Like 
Rule 4(a)(3), Rule 5 purports to extend the “jurisdictional” deadline 
for filing notices of appeal, and this extension would violate the Rules 
Enabling Act. 
A similarly confusing question arises in the context of appeals 
from orders granting or denying class certification.  Civil Rule 23(f) 
authorizes permissive appeal of class-certification orders under a con-
gressional grant of authority to the rulemakers to define which orders 
can be appealed interlocutorily.191  Under Rule 23(f), a party has ten 
days to petition for permission to file an appeal.192  Rule 23(f) presents 
yet another area where congressional control of jurisdiction and the 
limited authority of the rulemakers meet. 
Rule 23(f) uses congressional authorization to allow permissive 
appeals from these orders.  Civil Rule 6(b), however, fails to include 
                                                          
188 FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(2). 
189 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2006). 
190 FED. R. APP. P. 5(a)(3).   
191 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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Rule 23(f).193  By the terms of Civil Rule 6(a), therefore, a court 
should be able to extend the deadline to petition for permission to 
appeal for excusable neglect or good cause, but not the actual dead-
line to file notice of appeal, which would arguably still be the thirty 
days provided for in § 2107. 
Courts are split on whether the ten-day deadline to file a notice of 
appeal in Rule 23(f) is jurisdictional.194  The rule only speaks to per-
mission to appeal, and not to the actual deadline to file a notice of 
appeal, creating a tension between a jurisdictional rule and a jurisdic-
tional statute.  This language may not present an issue regarding the 
authority of the rulemakers because Congress has specifically dele-
gated the authority to allow interlocutory appeals.195  One could read 
the authorization of interlocutory appeals, however, to not extend to 
authorizing supersession of a jurisdictional statute directing how such 
appeals are to be taken. 
The difficulty in applying the term “jurisdictional” to permissive 
appeals shows the limits of Bowles’s elevation of statutes above court 
rules.  Much of what the rulemakers have done since 1948 to the re-
quirements for filing notice of appeal could be viewed as beyond their 
authority because a statute passed in 1948 at the request of the rule-
makers has been incorrectly interpreted as a strict jurisdictional bar. 
E.  Status of the Doctrine of Unique Circumstances 
The doctrine of unique circumstances could survive despite being, 
as the Court has said, in a “40-year slumber.”196  The Court only elimi-
nated the doctrine to the “extent [it] purport[s] to authorize an ex-
ception to a jurisdictional rule.”197  If circuit courts continue to reverse 
their precedent that post-trial motions and notices of appeal for crimi-
nal defendants are “mandatory and jurisdictional,” then the doctrine 
                                                          
193 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). 
194 See Gutierrez v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 187, 198 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(finding Rule 23(f) nonjurisdictional but recognizing that other circuits have called it 
jurisdictional). 
195 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006).  One could argue that Congress should be unable 
to delegate the important constitutional function of shaping the federal courts’ juris-
diction.  See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 498 (1989) (arguing that a court’s Chevron 
deference to an administrative agency over which it has jurisdiction violates nondele-
gation principles). 
196 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). 
197 Id.
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may have some life. 198  Courts may use the doctrine to determine 
when reliance on a district court’s extension of time to file post-trial 
motions tolls the time to appeal. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit found that failure to object to an 
untimely post-trial motion makes the motion “timely” for purposes of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) because the timeliness requirement of the toll-
ing provision was a forfeitable claim-processing rule.199  The Sixth Cir-
cuit did not mention the doctrine but essentially adopted it by allow-
ing a notice of appeal filed after thirty days because the district court 
deemed a motion to alter or amend the judgment timely.  It reached 
this conclusion even though the motion to amend was filed more than 
ten days after judgment.200  Filing a timely post-trial motion listed in 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4), if properly done, would postpone the dead-
line for filing an appeal.201  If the other side fails to object, granting an 
unopposed motion or extension to file such a motion outside the time 
limit would be an assurance by a judicial officer that the post-trial mo-
tion was properly done because it would be valid under the claim-
processing rule.  Thus the litigant could claim the definition of the 
doctrine in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney was met:  “a party has per-
formed an act which, if properly done, would postpone the deadline 
for filing his appeal and has received specific assurance by a judicial 
officer that this act has been properly done.”202
                                                          
198 Circuit courts continue to question the doctrine’s existence and apply it nar-
rowly.  See, e.g., Gutierrez, 523 F.3d at 198-99 (questioning whether the doctrine applied 
to nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules but finding that, even if it did, the appellant 
did not receive the required specific assurance). 
199 See Nat’l Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (find-
ing a motion to alter or amend the judgment timely because opposing counsel failed to 
object to it as late when the district court granted an extension to file the motion). 
200 Id. But see Dill v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 525 F.3d 612, 619-20 & n.10 (8th Cir. 
2008) (rejecting the argument that the party opposing a motion forfeited an objection 
by raising the timeliness issue in its merits brief instead of objecting when the exten-
sion was granted). 
201 The rule includes motions under Civil Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b) and (d), 60(b) 
and (c) (if filed within ten days), and a motion for attorneys’ fees under Rule 54, if the 
court extends the time to appeal under Rule 58.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
202 See 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989) (differentiating a court’s merely hearing argu-
ments on a late post-trial motion from the judge’s providing specific assurance of time-
liness).  The fact that such motions are likely no longer governed by jurisdictional 
deadlines may change the stringency with which courts apply the doctrine of unique 
circumstances—if it is applied at all.  Some case law, however, holds that extensions for 
post-trial motions are not within the doctrine.  See, e.g., Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., 
Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to find that an extension for a mo-
tion for a new trial would provide assurance that a subsequent notice of appeal would 
be timely).   
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Although Kontrick and Eberhart dictated many of the changes in ju-
risdictional status, it appears that Bowles, by using an if-statutory-then-
jurisdictional formulation for deadlines, acted much like a limiting in-
struction calling attention not to what was jurisdictional but rather to 
what was not.  The importance of Bowles may not be in what it labeled 
as jurisdictional, which lower courts continued to treat as jurisdic-
tional despite the Kontrick line of cases, but rather that the framework 
allows courts to exclude rules from what is jurisdictional.203  The 
unique-circumstances doctrine could still be applied to this growing 
subset of deadlines. 
IV. DIVORCING “JURISDICTIONAL” FROM THE FEDERAL RULES:
REFORMING THE SYSTEM OF PROVIDING FINALITY
The Court should work with Congress, through the rulemaking 
process, to fashion a way to treat post-trial and notice-of-appeal re-
quirements that clearly identifies both who has authority to amend 
the requirements and the consequences of failing to meet the re-
quirements. 
The current status of the law in many ways resembles that of the 
pre–Rules Enabling Act procedural landscape on issues of finality.  
The original rulemakers rejected the unfairness of the term-of-court 
system because it arbitrarily left litigants with cases at the end of the 
term less time to challenge the judgment.204  However, courts still 
sometimes treat litigants in similar positions differently.  Even if the 
circuits resolved their splits, deadlines would still be jurisdictional for 
notice of appeal in civil cases and for the government in criminal 
cases, but not for cross-appeals (possibly) or for criminal defendants.  
Post-trial motions are not jurisdictional, even though courts have 
treated them similarly to notices of appeal for more than forty years.  
The current situation calls for more than the piecemeal reform that 
the Court has provided by addressing the issue on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                          
203 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits reversed longstanding 
precedent holding rule-based deadlines jurisdictional after Bowles. See sources cited 
supra notes 165, 176.  Only the Ninth Circuit did so after Kontrick and Eberhart. See
sources cited supra notes 165, 176; see also Poor, supra note 8, at 219-21.  The D.C. Cir-
cuit did so for part of the Appellate Rules but had the advantage of citing the Bowles
lower-court opinions.  See Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1146 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (finding part of the tolling provision of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to be a claim-
processing rule). 
204 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (explaining 
reasons for the rejection of the terms of court). 
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The solution must acknowledge the fact that the creation of the 
federal rules represented a triumph of equity.205  The recent rise of 
claim-processing rules further introduced flexibility and approached 
an introduction of equity to the area of finality.206  Any reform of the 
current system must keep in mind that equity led to the success of the 
original rules, as stated by Judge William Chesnut of the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland and recounted to the early 
Rules Committee: 
My own comment from experience is that in five years of observation of 
the rules and their operation in a large metropolitan area, I have yet to 
note an instance in which they have been found lacking.  Particularly it 
should be impressive to lawyers that no case has come under my notice 
in which any lawyer or client has suffered ultimate disadvantage from de-
fault or ignorance.  There are literally no pitfalls or traps from which 
they cannot be extricated by the reasonable discretion of the judge, 
where the parties and their counsel have exercised good faith and the 
most ordinary diligence.  The reason for this remarkable result is the 
flexibility of the rules in giving large discretion to the judge to relieve 
against inadvertent mistakes, and the simplicity and clarity of the rules.207
Judge Chesnut, however, spoke before the rules governed notice-
of-appeal deadlines and expanded the number of motions that had 
unextendable deadlines.208  Unfortunately, the past sixty years of prac-
tice in labeling post-trial motions “jurisdictional” has had its fair share 
of pitfalls and traps.209
                                                          
205 See Subrin, supra note 1, at 973-74. 
206 Claim-processing rules themselves, however, are inflexible once a litigant in-
vokes the relevant deadline in the rule.  See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004) 
(“[A] claim-processing rule . . . even if unalterable on a party’s application, can none-
theless be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.”).  
The Court did not reach the issue of whether equitable considerations can apply to 
claim-processing rules.  Id. at 457.  In determining when claim-processing rules that 
involve “judicial interests beyond those of the parties” are forfeited, the Tenth Circuit 
has ruled that judges can impose restrictions sua sponte if there is “indication that effi-
ciency of judicial administration or finality are implicated.”  United States v. Mitchell, 
518 F.3d 740, 751 (10th Cir. 2008).  This more flexible approach echoes the equity-
based approach of Harris Truck Lines, provided that the opposition has failed to object. 
207 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 43-44. 
208 The original rules did not contain a limitation on the time to appeal (which was 
set by statute) and only prevented the period for filing a motion for a new trial from be-
ing extended.  The time periods for other motions were made nonextendable and a 
deadline for filing notice of appeal added in the 1946 amendments.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
209 For example, the Advisory Committee had to fix a “trap for an unsuspecting 
litigant” created by the 1979 amendment to Appellate Rule 4 that had been used to 
nullify a notice of appeal filed before a post-trial motion or while a post-trial motion 
was pending.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.  
Allowing judges to exercise some discretion would mitigate the draconian results 
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Any reform to the current system of post-trial motions and notices 
of appeal must clarify the authority of the rulemakers to enact such 
rules, identify a process—the Court acting through its rulemaking 
power, as opposed to an unclear mixture of rulemaking and legisla-
tion—by which shortcomings can be addressed, and allow judges 
some discretion to make reasonable decisions regarding implementa-
tion of the rules, all while still preserving finality. 
A.  Authority of the Rulemakers to Reform the Deadlines 
Determining the authority of the rulemakers to reform the cur-
rent system requires an examination of the authority of the rulemak-
ers to act in the face of a jurisdictional statute and the ability of the 
rulemakers to disturb the finality of judgments. 
The principle that “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower fed-
eral court’s subject matter jurisdiction”210 implies that the rules cannot 
alter subject matter jurisdiction because congressional action in the 
rulemaking process is indirect compared to most grants or limitations 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  Most grants of jurisdiction are “consid-
ered and enacted exclusively by Congress, the body in which Article 
III of the Constitution vests the authority to regulate federal court ju-
risdiction.”211  The Court implied as much in Bowles,212 and beginning 
with the adoption of Civil Rule 82, the rules have stated that they do 
not affect the jurisdiction of the district courts, with jurisdiction refer-
ring to subject matter jurisdiction.  In addition, Congress has specifi-
cally authorized the rulemakers to alter the appellate jurisdiction of 
the courts of appeals in certain ways,213 implying that the original 
grant does not authorize altering subject matter jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                               
sometimes created by unclear rules.  See Nana Quay-Smith, Post Trial Motions & Notice of 
Appeal:  Avoiding the Trap for the Unwary, 37 RES GESTAE 130 (1993) (summarizing prob-
lems caused by the unclear distinction between motions that toll the time to appeal 
under Rule 4(a)(4) and motions that do not). 
210 Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452. 
211 14 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 82.02 (3d ed. 1997). 
212 See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2367 (2007) (“If rigorous rules like the 
one applied today are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to 
promulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”); see also Owen 
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.”). 
213 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006) (allowing rules to authorize interlocutory ap-
peals); id. § 2072(c) (allowing rules to define when a ruling is final for purposes of de-
termining appellate jurisdiction). 
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Section 2107, governing the time to file notices of appeal in civil 
cases, affects the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction,214 as  § 3731 likely 
does for the time that the government has to file notice of appeal in a 
criminal case.215  Although the prior cases finding notice of appeal 
mandatory and jurisdictional were unclear as to whether the require-
ments codified in § 2107 invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts,216 Bowles makes clear that they do.217  There is no appli-
cable statutory delegation of power under which the rulemakers could 
alter the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in this re-
spect; the rulemakers likely do not have authority to alter the re-
quirements of § 2107 or § 3731, even though they have previously 
amended Appellate Rule 4(a) to expand the ability to appeal beyond 
what is allowed under § 2107. 
The ability of the rulemakers to authorize or limit the transfer of a 
case to the courts of appeals by filing notices of appeal remains prob-
lematic under the Rules Enabling Act.  However, any problems are 
likely to coincide with the issue of whether the rulemakers’ actions 
contradict a statute setting the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts 
of appeals.  As the Court has clarified in the line of cases running 
from Kontrick to Bowles, only Congress can determine the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the federal courts in the absence of a specific dele-
gation of that power.  Two statutory provisions already provide general 
grants of appellate jurisdiction.218  If § 2107 and § 3731 did not exist, 
the appellate and civil rules could be seen as only directing the 
method of such a transfer given a separate statutory grant of jurisdic-
tion, and therefore not affecting courts’ jurisdiction. 
If a relevant jurisdictional statute does not pose an issue, the issues 
of finality tied to post-trial motions are likely on the procedural side of 
the procedure-substance distinction.  However, some thought must be 
given to whether finality of judgment represents a substantive right or, 
assuming that the second sentence of the Rules Enabling Act is sur-
                                                          
214 See supra Part I.D. 
215 See supra Part III.A. 
216 See Hall, supra note 8, at 400-18 (discussing the historical use of “jurisdictional” 
for notices of appeal and concluding that the requirements involve something more 
like personal than subject matter jurisdiction). 
217 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365-66 (2007). 
218 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting jurisdiction on appeals from final judg-
ments); id. § 1292 (granting jurisdiction over interlocutory orders). 
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plusage,219 whether it falls on the substantive side of the procedure-
substance distinction. 
Like limitation or abatement of actions,220 finality of judgment 
necessarily entails a determination of when rights are extinguished.221
Unlike statutes of limitations or abatement of actions, the deadlines 
for filing post-trial motions and notices of appeal extinguish proce-
dural rights created by the rules themselves—the avenue and manner 
of challenging a judgment.  The rulemakers replaced the system for 
determining finality—the terms of court—without having to super-
sede statutes.222  Many of the issues regarding finality, however, like the 
original term-of-court system, rested on federal decisional law, which 
the legislative history of the Rules Enabling Act’s limitations failed to 
address when discussing the extent of the rulemakers’ authority.223  Yet 
given the historical practice of the rulemakers acting in the area224 and 
the procedural nature of the rights involved, the rulemakers likely 
have the authority to determine when judgments are final.225
With respect to the authority of rulemakers to make changes to 
post-trial motions and notices of appeal, the various deadlines and re-
quirements fall into two different categories.  In the first, the rule-
makers have the authority to alter the content of Civil Rule 6(b) and 
its analogs and notice-of-appeal requirements for criminal defendants 
under Rule 4(b).  In the second, based on current Supreme Court 
precedent, the rulemakers arguably do not have the authority to alter 
the requirements of Appellate Rule 4(a) regarding deadlines for 
                                                          
219 See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1107-08 (arguing that the Supreme Court was 
right to not give the second sentence independent meaning). 
220 See id. at 1121 (“Limitation or abatement of actions is included in this category 
[of matters involving substantive legal and remedial rights] because the decision when 
to bar or abate a claim limits whatever rights have been conferred on the claimant by 
the substantive law.”). 
221 See James Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rodgers, Federal Relief From Civil Judg-
ments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 629 (1946) (“Historically, the term[-of-court] rule can be ade-
quately explained as a rule of repose (somewhat analogous to a statute of limitations), 
which the common law and equity courts invoked to give finality to their judgments.”). 
222 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(c) advisory committee’s note (“Such statutes as [former 28 
U.S.C. § 12] (Trials not discontinued by new term) are not affected.”). 
223 See Burbank, supra note 18, at 1112 n.447, 1125 n.501 (noting that Congress did 
not indicate whether the supersession clause or procedural limitation prevented the 
rulemakers from altering federal decisional law).  
224 See FED. R. CIV. P. 6 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment (comment-
ing on the removal of the traditional means of determining finality, the terms-of-court 
system); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (providing various methods of upsetting the finality of 
judgments).
225 The Rules Enabling Act currently allows the rules to determine finality.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006). 
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criminal appeals; because they are codified in § 2107 and § 3731, they 
fall outside the rulemakers’ grant of authority. 
B. Introducing Equity into Civil Rule 6 and Its Analogs 
At the end of the Bowles opinion, the Court suggests one possible 
solution to the inequities caused by strict deadlines:  a congressional 
grant of power to the rulemakers to alter jurisdictional deadlines.226
However, this solution has disadvantages.  First, it is an overly broad so-
lution to a problem that affects only a handful of statutes.227  Congress 
may hesitate to empower the Court to set the contours of the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction.228  Second, such a solution would involve use of the 
supersession clause, potentially leading to needless litigation229 at a 
time when the usefulness of the clause may still be in doubt.230
Unless the Court can be convinced to reverse its holding that 
§ 2107 is a jurisdictional limitation on the federal courts,231 the rule-
                                                          
226 Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2367 (2007). 
227 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006).  There are likely 
numerous statutes for appealing an agency order that involve “jurisdictional” deadlines 
based on Bowles’s jurisdictionality default or normal statutory interpretation.  See, e.g.,
Bah v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding an exhaustion require-
ment governing appeals from decisions of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals to be 
jurisdictional under Bowles); see also Poor, supra note 8, at 204 (listing statutes that have 
been deemed jurisdictional).  Such statutes are outside the scope of this Comment’s 
recommendations, however.  The inequitable results and confusion from having “ju-
risdictional” deadlines in such contexts may not occur as frequently as with transfers 
from district courts to circuit courts.  Such reviews initiate those cases in federal courts 
and may involve issues similar to statutes of limitations, which might implicate substan-
tive rights, making reform by rule inappropriate.  In addition, Rule 4 and several other 
provisions do not apply to review of agency decisions or tax court decisions.  See FED. R.
APP. P. 14 (providing that Rule 4 does not apply to the review of a Tax Court decision); 
FED. R. APP. P. 15 (describing procedure for the review of agency orders). 
228 Congress, however, has delegated this power in similar situations.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(c) (2006) (allowing the rulemakers to determine what constitutes a final judg-
ment).
229 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-322, at 5-6 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1303, 
1305-06 (commenting on the need to avoid the “wastefully expensive litigation and 
inadvertent loss of rights of appeal in a procedural snarl” that a controversy over the 
supersession clause would cause). 
230 In 1988, the House of Representatives attempted to eliminate the supersession 
clause, finding it “unnecessary and of dubious constitutionality.”  Id. at 6, reprinted at
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1306.  The clause remained, however, partially because Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist assured Congress that if it remained, the “judicial branch would not su-
persede statutes without giving Congress every opportunity to examine the proposals.” 
Id. See generally Burbank, supra note 45, at 1030-46 (summarizing the controversy). 
231 The possibility of such a reversal may not be unreasonable given Justice Gins-
burg’s statement and the attempts to recast the holding in John R. Sand & Gravel Co.
See supra note 130. 
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makers will need Congress to act affirmatively to regain control over 
the requirements of Appellate Rule 4.  Rather than hope that the 
Court reverses the problematic holding of Bowles, the Court, Judicial 
Conference, and other actors in the federal rulemaking process (in-
cluding Congress) should work to revise the system of deadlines for 
post-trial motions and notices of appeal in light of the Court’s recent 
attempts to clean up the use of the word “jurisdictional,” starting with 
a repeal of § 2107.232 Other than allowing equitable exceptions to the 
time to file notices of appeal, which would arguably alter the possibly 
jurisdictional statutes, the rulemakers can make some changes within 
their current authority.  In addition, the rulemakers should ask Con-
gress to repeal § 2107 in order to allow them to continue promulgat-
ing rules that create a uniform system for procedure that governs the 
transfer of a case from the district court to the court of appeals. 
1.  Responsibilities of the Court as an Adjudicatory Body 
With the removal of the “jurisdictional” label from the post-trial 
and notice-of-appeal deadlines, courts should be willing to interpret 
the rules more flexibly and to restore equitable exceptions to correct 
injustices that may arise from the complicated requirements of filing 
post-trial motions and notices of appeal.  There are two steps that 
the Court could take through adjudication, as opposed to through 
rulemaking.  The first would be to overrule Bowles to the extent that 
it finds statutory deadlines jurisdictional by default.  The default 
finding contradicts the Court’s approach for nondeadline statutory 
requirements, which are generally viewed as being nonjurisdictional 
by default.233
                                                          
232 Professor Phillip Pucillo has suggested that Congress directly codify the doc-
trine of unique circumstance into § 2107.  See Pucillo, supra note 106, at 728-29.  This 
approach has several drawbacks, however.  First, it would not correct the problem of 
the rulemakers’ inability to alter Rule 4(a) in other ways without congressional action.  
Second, it would not correct the questionable validity of the doctrine for post-trial mo-
tions.  See infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text.  Third, by allowing the rulemak-
ers to control the amendment instead of Congress, it would allow for greater refine-
ment and accountability, as the rulemaking process is more responsive and specialized 
than the legislative process.  See Struve, supra note 86, at 1133-36 (“Nor do the rule-
makers display legislative inertia:  in the sixty-three years since the adoption of the 
Rules, the rulemaking process has produced some twenty-four packages of revisions to 
the Rules, including—since the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act—eight pack-
ages of amendments affecting thirty-five different Rules.”). 
233 See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-16 (2006) (applying a default of 
nonjurisdictionality to find an employee-numerosity requirement nonjurisdictional).
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The second step that the federal courts could take is to reexamine 
Robinson and Harris Truck Lines, not for their doctrinal holdings re-
garding jurisdiction, which the Court has rightly questioned, but as a 
guide to interpreting the federal rules to provide procedural justice. 
a. A Default of Nonjurisdictionality 
The Court itself could help reform the use of “jurisdictional” by 
partially overruling its holding in Bowles.  Although much of the rea-
soning in Bowles comports with a stronger understanding of jurisdic-
tional limitations—limitations set by Congress that cannot be altered 
by the courts in any manner, including rulemaking—the application 
of that definition remains questionable.  In finding that statutory 
deadlines are presumptively jurisdictional, the Court parted from the 
approach used for nondeadline requirements234 and statutes of limita-
tions.235  Instead of finding deadlines jurisdictional by default, the 
Court should have used the opposite rule,236 particularly when labeling 
a statute “jurisdictional” would remove the issue from the ambit of the 
rulemakers, thereby reducing the congressional delegation of power. 
Whether or not deadlines set before litigation commences should 
be found jurisdictional by default, courts should hesitate to deem 
deadlines after the commencement of litigation, such as the deadline 
provided in § 2107, to be jurisdictional.  A default finding of nonjuris-
dictionality for limits within the rulemakers’ authority would comport 
with the framework that Congress enacted before recent attempts to 
clarify the meaning of “jurisdictional.”237
The text of a statute governing conduct during litigation cannot 
clearly answer the question whether the statute is jurisdictional in 
                                                          
234 Id.
235 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2008) (noting 
that Irwin v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), establishes a “rebuttable pre-
sumption” that statutes of limitations are subject to equitable tolling). 
236 See Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUOY 42, 46-48 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/ 
2007/21/LRColl2007n21Dodson.pdf (arguing that the presumption should be that 
statutory requirements are mandatory, but not jurisdictional). 
237 This approach would divorce the issues of the jurisdictionality of time limits 
during litigation from those prelitigation issues like statutes of limitations, which pre-
sent much different issues of the rulemakers’ power and congressional intent.  See John 
R. Sand & Gravel Co., 128 S. Ct. at 755-57 (discussing the issues of interpretation pre-
sented in finding statutes of limitations jurisdictional).  The three dissenters in 
Greenlaw who reached the jurisdictional issue found the statute nonjurisdictional be-
cause it was silent on the issue.  Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2571-72 
(2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).  This finding would conflict with Bowles’s reasoning.  
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many cases, as the word “jurisdictional” has had very little meaning in 
the context of deadlines after the commencement of litigation.238
Similarly, the history of a statute suffers the same problem unless it 
can be shown that Congress had a clear conception of the term or 
wanted to remove the issue from the rulemakers’ authority.  The word 
“jurisdiction” has been “a word of many, too many, meanings”239 that 
has prevented the Court from clearly appreciating the conflict be-
tween jurisdictional deadlines and the authority of the rulemakers.  
Such confusion has likely also prevented Congress from appreciating 
the effect that passing legislation would have on the rulemaking proc-
ess.  Given that Congress has acted to remove some issues from the 
rulemakers’ power during the period between the passage of the 
Rules Enabling Act240 and the clarification of the word “jurisdictional,” 
attempts to determine whether a requirement is “jurisdictional” 
should consider whether Congress intended to remove the issue from 
the scope of the rulemakers’ power. 
Using a default finding of nonjurisdictionality, § 2107 cannot be 
characterized as a jurisdictional limitation on the federal courts, even 
though its predecessor was likely jurisdictional.  The statute governing 
time to appeal prior to the creation of § 2107 represented a jurisdic-
tional limitation on the courts.241  It was contained in an act of Con-
gress specifically meant to “define the jurisdiction of the circuit courts 
of appeals and of the Supreme Court.”242  The rulemakers themselves 
were hesitant to supersede the deadline to appeal.243  Despite the 
status of § 2107’s predecessor, the current statute is a nonjurisdic-
tional statute meant to repeal a formerly jurisdictional requirement. 
The history of § 2107 shows that Congress originally meant for it 
to conform to the rules and later amended it for the same reason.244
                                                          
238 See supra Part II. 
239 Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)). 
240 For example, Congress withheld the ability to pass certain rules of evidence with-
out affirmative congressional action.  See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 
9 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074 note (2006)).  The issues with the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, however, primarily involved federalism, and not jurisdictional or separation-of-
powers issues.  See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 694 
(1974) (“Most of the objections were directed at the provisions refusing, even in diversity 
cases, to recognize the privileges created by state law and substituting a set of privileges 
defined by the Rules themselves.”). 
241 See 28 U.S.C § 230 (1946) (repealed 1948). 
242 Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 68 Pub. L. No. 415, 43 Stat. 936, 936.   
243 See supra note 76. 
244 See supra note 81 and accompanying text, note 126. 
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Congress meant to enable, and not to restrain, the rulemakers.  In 
addition, the legislative history of the 1991 amendments suggests that 
Congress merely wished to avoid litigation over supersession,245 and 
not that Congress wished to amend a jurisdictional statute that the 
federal rules could not supersede.  Congress was aware that some 
lower federal courts had found that Rule 4 superseded § 2107,246 yet it 
made no clear statement that § 2107 was a jurisdictional statute that 
the rules could not supersede. 
The reasons for codifying Rule 4 instead of repealing contrary 
statutes are unclear,247 but the twice-welcoming response to the rule-
makers’ suggestions about amendments shows that Congress did not 
give much thought to whether it was preserving control over the juris-
diction of the courts of appeals.  Even in light of the “jurisdictional” 
history of filing notices of appeal, § 2107’s ambiguous purpose would 
not provide enough justification to overcome a default finding of non-
jurisdictionality based on the dominance of the rulemakers in the 
process and lack of independent congressional indication that the 
statute was jurisdictional. 
The ambiguous use of “jurisdictional” supports a default finding 
of nonjurisdictionality as in Arbaugh, with the presumption being re-
butted if Congress clearly understood the term at the time of passage 
or intended to prevent the courts and rulemakers from altering the 
requirement.248  The text, history, and evolution of § 2107 do not re-
but that presumption.  Despite the use of “jurisdictional” for the re-
quirements for filing notice of appeal since Robinson, Congress cannot 
have intended to adopt a meaning of “jurisdictional” that was not fully 
clarified until Kontrick, Eberhart, and Bowles.  Such a reversal of the 
Court’s misstep in Bowles, however, likely will not come swiftly.  A bet-
                                                          
245 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-322, at 5-6 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1303, 
1305-06 (“If the rule change take [sic] effect, without modifications to the statutory 
text, questions may arise about which of the different provisions is controlling. The 
result will breed mindless litigation.”). 
246 In fact, the Rules Committee’s report to Congress stated that the rule had al-
ready been found to supersede § 2107.  See COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (1990) (noting that previous conflicts between statutes 
listing time to appeal had been resolved in favor of the rule). 
247 See Hall, supra note 8, at 412 n.60 (“For reasons no one has adequately ex-
plained, Congress, rather than repealing the longer appeal period then provided by 
statute, later amended the statutory codification to conform to the rule.”).  But see Wil-
liam Barron, The Judicial Code:  1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439 (1948) (explaining that the 
reason for the codification was that it “applie[d] to civil proceedings excluded from 
operation of the rules” at the time).   
248 See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-13 (2006). 
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ter approach simply would be to ask Congress to clarify the matter by 
repealing § 2107. 
b. Interpretation of the Federal Rules Regarding Finality 
The fact that a specialized body continually updates the rules sup-
ports sticking to a plain-meaning model of interpretation, as the rule-
makers can simply adjust the rules when courts fail to interpret them as 
intended.249  Even an active body, however, cannot foresee all circum-
stances, and allowing equitable considerations to affect the application 
of the rules has support both in the Court’s former approach to inter-
preting the deadlines for post-trial motions and notices of appeal and 
in the increased procedural fairness provided by such an approach. 
The rulemakers have consistently reacted to overly harsh or tech-
nical requirements for post-trial motions and notices of appeal.250
When viewing the history of rulemaking for post-trial motions and no-
tices of appeal as a whole,251 two themes become evident.  First, the 
                                                          
249 See Struve, supra note 86, at 1133-36 (“There is little need for courts to speculate 
how past rulemakers would have dealt with present circumstances because . . . the 
Committee exist[s] expressly to ‘carry on a continuous study of the [Rules’] operation 
and effect.’”(quoting 28 U.S.C. 331 § (1994)).  
250 Appellate Rule 4(a)(5), allowing for extension of time to file notices of appeal 
due to excusable neglect, was clarified because some courts held that they could only 
extend the time within thirty days of judgment, or that the motion had to be filed 
within thirty days.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee’s note to 1979 amend-
ment.  The provision for a premature notice of appeal to be effective if filed after 
judgment had been announced, but before a post-trial motion had disturbed finality, 
was added.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2), 4(a)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1993 
amendment.  A provision for an extension of time in the event a party failed to receive 
notice of the judgment was also added.  See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) advisory commit-
tee’s note to 1991 amendment.  It had to be amended later to clarify what type of no-
tice could preclude a party from appealing.  See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) advisory com-
mittee’s note to 2005 amendment.  The rulemakers rejected a technical reading of 
Rule 4(a)(5) that made extensions for good cause available only before the time to file 
notice of appeal expired, while excusable neglect extensions were available both be-
fore and after.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee’s note to 1979 amendment.  
Appellate Rule 4(b) added a good cause provision similar to the one for notices of ap-
peal in civil cases.  FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1998 amend-
ment.  Civil Rule 50 was amended to permit any motion for judgment as a matter of 
law to be renewed instead of only motions at the close of evidence, which despite being 
longstanding doctrine had confused attorneys.  FED. R. CIV. P. 50 advisory committee’s 
note to 2006 amendment.  Civil Rule 59 was amended to reverse findings that even 
though it allows for a court to order a new trial sua sponte and for litigants to move for 
a new trial, the trial court did not have the power to grant a new trial if a litigant had 
moved for the trial on other grounds.  FED. R. CIV. P. 59 advisory committee’s note to 
1966 amendment.   
251 See supra Part I. 
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rulemakers clearly intend to provide finality.  They also, however, 
clearly mean to ameliorate the effects of unbending rules for abnor-
mal cases and occurrences.  This supports a legislative history contrary 
to that focused solely on unbending deadlines, as in Bowles, because 
the rulemakers have acted to provide several exceptions.  Many unrea-
sonable results would have occurred had courts not already read some 
flexibility into the deadlines.  For example, in Harris Truck Lines, the 
availability of an extension to the deadline for filing notice of appeal 
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) would not have been much help to liti-
gants if the Court had not fashioned the doctrine of unique circum-
stances to allow the litigant to rely on the extension, even if improvi-
dently granted.252
The Court could provide a great service by relying on its prece-
dent in clarifying the approach that courts should follow when faced 
with issues of finality and the proper flexibility of the rules.  When one 
views Robinson as a case relying on abstention instead of jurisdiction 
and considers the decision in Harris Truck Lines, it appears that the 
Court’s approach between the Rules Enabling Act and Bowles was to 
decide issues in a way that enabled the rulemakers to act while avoid-
ing judicial reinterpretation of the rules in normal circumstances.  
Robinson clearly represented an abstention of the rulemakers on large-
scale policy issues. 
The Court in Harris Truck Lines, however, did not abstain when 
the rules provided some guidance or the policy choice involved a 
“unique circumstance.”  Harris Truck Lines and Thompson both repre-
sent the Court’s excusal of noncompliance with a strict reading of the 
rules, as such a reading would result in injustice in those particular 
circumstances.  Unlike in Robinson, the circumstances in these cases 
were so peculiar that a rare exception would not implicate “powerful 
policy arguments” regarding finality. 
The federal courts could rely on these opinions not for the doc-
trinal holdings, but for developing a proper approach when facing 
questions about the operation of the rules.  Robinson represents defer-
ence to the rulemakers on issues of large-scale policy, whereas Harris 
Truck Lines and its progeny acknowledge that the rulemakers are not 
omniscient and that “unique circumstances” require some interpreta-
tion of the rules and excusal of inadvertent de minimis violations of 
the rules’ deadlines. 
                                                          
252 Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc. 371 U.S. 215 (1962) (per 
curiam), overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). 
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A strong argument could be made that Harris Truck Lines and the 
doctrine of unique circumstances lack a doctrinal or logical founda-
tion, even when the issue of allowing equitable exceptions to jurisdic-
tional requirements is set aside.  Equitable exceptions are generally 
not allowed if a statute provides for a limited set of exceptions:  
“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a gen-
eral prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the 
absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”253  This restriction 
on applying equitable exceptions when others are listed likely applies 
with as much force in interpreting the federal rules. 
An argument could also be made that judges should interpret the 
federal rules even more strictly than they do statutes.  Professor Cath-
erine Struve has argued that “[t]he structure of the Enabling Act 
delegation and the reality of the rulemaking process together suggest 
that courts should have, if anything, less latitude to interpret the Rules 
than they do to interpret statutes.”254  This argument supports strict 
interpretation of the deadlines for other rules listed in Civil Rule 6 
and its analogs as having no equitable exceptions.  Civil Rule 6, like its 
analogs, commands that “[a] court must not extend the time to act 
under [specified rules] except as those rules allow.”255  For example, 
Appellate Rule 4(a)’s deadlines, which cannot be extended except by 
the provisions of Rule 4 under Appellate Rule 26, has specific exten-
sions for “excusable neglect or good cause,”256 and failure to receive 
notice of the judgment under Civil Rule 77.257  These specific excep-
tions imply that new ones should not be created. 
The strength of the doctrinal argument against finding unique 
circumstances highlights the questionable status of the doctrine after 
Osterneck and Bowles.  It also reinforces the strict interpretation shown 
                                                          
253 TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. 
Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980)). 
254 Struve, supra note 86, at 1120.  Professor Struve, however, was writing in con-
trast to earlier scholarship arguing that the rulemaking process gives the Court greater 
justification to freely interpret rules: 
Affording the Court flexibility in considering policy is particularly important 
when the issue in a case concerns matters unanticipated at the time of the 
framing of the Rule.  Of course, this factor is important in statutory construc-
tion as well, but again the Court’s dual roles as promulgator and interpreter 
make flexibility at the interpretation stage especially appropriate. 
Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1094-95 (1993). 
255 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2).  
256 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
257 FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). 
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in Robinson.  The Court twice recognized, in Harris Truck Lines and 
Thompson, however, “the obvious great hardship to a party who relies 
upon the trial judge’s finding” and then defaults because of that reli-
ance.258  In addition, the Court—not the rulemakers—acted to restrict 
the doctrine, implying that the doctrine at the very least was not such 
an affront to finality that it should prompt amendments as Hill did.  
The unfairness that can arise in exceptional circumstances provides a 
justification for adopting equity by codifying the doctrine of unique 
circumstances in the federal rules and reinstating the approach of the 
Robinson and Harris Truck Line lines of cases. 
2.  Repeal of § 2107 
Section 2107 serves little purpose aside from being a jurisdictional 
bar that prevents courts from allowing equitable exceptions and bar-
ring rulemakers from amending their own creation of Rule 4. Con-
gress only meant to codify the rule.  Thus, repealing § 2107 has several 
benefits.  First, repeal allows rulemakers to control the entire system 
of post-trial motions and notices of appeal, except for appeals by the 
government in criminal cases.259  This would allow the rulemakers to 
address something to which they did not give much thought in the 
early rulemaking period:  what, if any, equitable exceptions there 
should be to the deadlines contained in Rule 6(b) and its analogs, in-
cluding the deadline to filing a notice of appeal. 
Congress seems to wish to avoid the further litigation and political 
battles over the supersession clause that retaining § 2107 will invite.  
Avoidance of supersession litigation spurred the 1991 amendment of 
§ 2107,260 and a full repeal would better serve that purpose.  Because 
of the different pace of the rulemaking process and congressional leg-
islative activity, the 1991 amendment to § 2107 occurred after new 
rules had gone into effect and still does not exactly correspond with 
the rules. 
In addition, asking Congress to repeal § 2107 will clearly define 
the authority of the rulemakers with regard to notices of appeal and 
other rules involved in moving cases from the district court to the 
                                                          
258 Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 386 (1964) (per curiam) (quoting Harris 
Truck Lines, Inc., v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962)), overruled by
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). 
259 See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006) (containing the exceptions for appeals by the gov-
ernment).
260 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-322, at 5-6 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1303, 
1305-06 (noting the benefits of avoiding supersession litigation). 
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court of appeals.  If Congress repeals the statute, then the rulemakers’ 
authority would no longer be questioned based on the Court’s hold-
ing in Bowles.  If Congress fails to repeal § 2107, it could indicate that 
the rulemakers do not have such authority,261 but more importantly, 
questions of the validity of amendments to Appellate Rule 4(a) would 
remain due to the Court’s holding in Bowles.
The statute governing notices of appeal for the United States in 
criminal cases has a similar effect.  The Court has not reached a con-
clusion on the jurisdictionality of § 3731 after the Court’s recent foray 
into cleaning up the meaning of “jurisdictional,” even though Bowles
arguably calls for finding it jurisdictional by default.262
There are, however, reasons for not seeking the repeal of the per-
tinent sections of § 3731.  First, Congress appears to have meant 
§ 3731 to allow appeals by the United States to the full extent allowed 
by the Double Jeopardy Clause.263  This contrasts with § 2107, which 
merely codified the rulemakers’ suggestions.  Instead, the thirty-day 
limit in Rule 4(b) was added to the rules to conform to statutory 
changes.264  Second, the risks of inequitable results from a stricter 
deadline are lessened because § 3731 only applies to appeals by the 
United States.  These appeals are taken by a discrete group of gov-
ernment lawyers who would be familiar with the case law on how to 
take such an appeal.  The United States also has a longer period to 
take an appeal than the defendant does,265 which mitigates any unfair-
ness to the prosecutor in having stricter consequences for failing to 
                                                          
261 The significance of legislative inaction is debatable.  The current Congress’s 
views on § 2107 expressed through legislative inaction would shed little light on what 
Congress thought of § 2107 at its creation and amendment.  See Eskridge, supra note 
187, at 96 (“If subsequent legislative statements directly supporting a statutory interpre-
tation are not valid evidence, how can subsequent legislative silence, usually just indi-
rectly supporting a statutory interpretation, be considered any more authoritative?”).   
262 This part of Bowles, however, may be on weaker ground after the court revised 
the rationale to be one of judicial efficiency rather than the fact  that the requirement 
was statutory.  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (2008). 
263 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975) 
(explaining that, with § 3731, “Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to 
Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit”); 
United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1097-99 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the legisla-
tive history of § 3731 before finding that the district court’s judgment of acquittal was 
appealable without double jeopardy concern).  
264 See Stanton, 501 F.3d at 1097 (stating that appeals by the government must be 
authorized by Congressional enactment, as in § 3731).  Section 3731 predated the 
creation of the provisions governing notices of appeal for the government in Rule 
4(b), which adopted the section’s thirty-day period.  Compare Act of June 25, 1948, 80 
Pub. L. No. 773,  § 2107, 62 Stat. 844, 963 (1948) with FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1). 
265 FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1).  
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meet the deadline.  In addition, § 3731 raises serious policy issues 
concerning double jeopardy and the right to a speedy trial, even 
though the statute limits appeals to those allowed under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. These issues may best be left to Congress, which has 
shown an interest in legislating in the area. 
3.  Retaining Claim-Processing Rules with Some Modification 
The concept of claim-processing rules provided a stopgap to deal 
with the effects of clarifying the meaning of “jurisdictional” and the 
implications of late filings that the label invokes.  Because the term 
“jurisdictional” had so often been used as shorthand for a sua sponte 
nonextendable deadline, the Court had to fashion something to fill its 
place.  However, the current definition of claim-processing rules has 
some drawbacks. 
Claim-processing rules may give greater discretion to litigants than 
to the trial judge.266  Although the early rulemakers’ discussions pro-
vide some support for putting the power to alter deadlines in the 
hands of the opposing litigant because the rulemakers were con-
cerned about overly sympathetic judges giving losing litigants another 
chance,267  they did not consider the situation when the judge inadver-
tently misleads a litigant.268  If, as in Bowles, the inequity results from 
reliance on the trial judge, the court has limited power to relieve the 
litigant of the burden that the court has placed on her, because of the 
questionable status of the unique-circumstances doctrine.269  On the 
other hand, silence by opposing counsel can extend the time, possibly 
even if it would be inequitable to do so.270
The rulemakers could simply repudiate the idea of claim-
processing rules and adopt language in Rule 6(b) and its analogs stat-
ing that the listed rules are nonextendable, must be raised by the 
court sua sponte, and have no equitable exceptions.271  This would re-
                                                          
266 See Burch, supra note 5, at 65 (expressing dissatisfaction with the mandatory 
aspect of claim-processing rules because “it leaves no room for equity absent the mercy 
of opposing counsel”). 
267 See 1944 MINUTES, supra note 59, at 27. 
268 See id. at 1-87 (failing to mention such a situation). 
269 The questionable status is discussed supra Part III.E. 
270 The circuit that first addressed these issues rejected the claim that the timeli-
ness of a notice of appeal in a criminal case could never be raised sua sponte.  United 
States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750 (10th Cir. 2008). 
271 There does not appear to be any limitation to the rulemakers’ ability to do this, 
so long as they make clear that they are not making jurisdictional rules, but mandatory 
rules with the same consequences as jurisdictional limitations.  Adding a sua sponte 
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pudiate two recent unanimous Supreme Court decisions supporting 
claim-processing rules as well as the remains of the doctrine of unique 
circumstances.272  It would also represent a step backward in giving 
courts the ability to correct defaults created by their own misleading 
actions.
A better answer would be to adopt the solution proposed by a 
unanimous Court, but modified slightly to limit the ability of litigants 
to affect interests aside from their own.  The Kontrick Court recog-
nized this to a degree in limiting forfeiture that would substantially af-
fect the rights of others with a recognizable interest in the suit.273  On 
a similar note, the rulemakers should not adopt the claim-processing 
rule for notices of appeal.  Concerns about judicial efficiency274 and 
the large caseload of the circuit courts275 require a different approach 
for notices of appeal than for post-trial motions.  Unlike cases where 
the doctrine of unique circumstances may apply and procedural fair-
ness counterbalances judicial efficiency, when a party has failed to ob-
ject, there is no countervailing private interest to overcome the inter-
est of judicial efficiency.  A failure to object simply implies that there 
is no private interest on the other side.  Accordingly, the claim-
processing rules should only extend to motions in the district and 
bankruptcy courts. 
Assuming that Congress repeals § 2107, the rulemakers can in-
clude a provision in Rule 4 that allows the courts of appeals to dismiss 
any late appeal sua sponte, even if the opposing party has not objected.  
This approach would retain the historic ability of the courts of appeals 
                                                                                                                               
provision would not be new either, as district courts can already grant a new trial on 
their own initiative.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(d).
272 Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (per curiam) (“We break no 
new ground in firmly classifying Rules 33 and 45 as claim-processing rules . . . .”); Kon-
trick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004)(“[T]he filing deadlines prescribed in Bankruptcy 
Rules 4004 and 9006(b)(3) are claim-processing rules . . . .”).  
273 See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 457 n.12 (“Nor should anything in this opinion be read 
to suggest that a debtor and creditor may stipulate to the assertion of time-barred 
claims when such an accommodation would operate to the detriment of other credi-
tors.”).  At least one circuit, in determining whether such requirements can be taken 
up sua sponte, recognized that claim-processing rules could involve interests of judicial 
administration.  Mitchell, 518 F.3d at 750. 
274 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753 (2008) (cit-
ing Bowles as an example of strict deadlines motivated by judicial efficiency). 
275 See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization:  The Origins and 
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 659, 
661-63 (2007) (commenting on the increased caseload of the appellate court and its 
effect on how cases are decided). 
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to control their own caseload and offset any increase in caseload due 
to the reinstatement of the doctrine of unique circumstances. 
4.  Awakening the Slumbering Doctrine of Unique Circumstances 
The cases applying the doctrine of unique circumstances, like the 
Court’s jurisdictional doctrine, have been mixed and often contradic-
tory.276  Having a clear limit on the power of the district court to ex-
tend deadlines both provides finality and reduces the docket of the 
appellate court.  A strict limit with no exceptions, however, also can 
put litigants in a precarious position.  Litigants would be unable to 
rely on deadlines set by the district court, as in Bowles, and would, out 
of caution, still file a notice of appeal even if a district court judge ex-
pressly stated that a post-trial motion was timely and tolled the time to 
appeal or otherwise extended the deadlines.277
This situation results in wasted effort by courts and litigants, be-
cause either the litigant files an unnecessary notice of appeal or the 
litigant prosecutes an invalid motion in the district court.  Allowing 
the litigant to rely on the district court would reduce the waste of ju-
dicial and litigant time and resources caused by these futile actions.  
In addition, it would provide a common-sense and fair solution to liti-
gants who do nothing other than rely on the district courts’ state-
ments or the import of the lower courts’ actions. 
The degree to which the doctrine can excuse a late notice of ap-
peal will be important in balancing the needs for control of appellate 
caseloads and finality with the need for fair procedural rules and reli-
ance on judicial statements.  The doctrine of unique circumstances, in 
its current form, would only cover a district court’s affirmative state-
ment that a litigant timely filed a post-trial motion.  Cases in which the 
district court either sets an erroneous deadline for notice of appeal or 
extends the deadline would not be covered because such extensions 
of time could theoretically never be done properly because the rules 
prevent extension. 
                                                          
276 See generally Pucillo, supra note 106, at 713-15 (describing the flaws of, and confu-
sion stemming from, the Osterneck conception of the doctrine of unique circumstances). 
277 Without the doctrine, litigants should be wary of relying on an extension for 
good cause under Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) because the unique-circumstances doctrine 
was created to allow reliance on the extensions, even if the district court had errone-
ously found good cause to grant them.  See, e.g., Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry 
Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962) (per curiam) (applying the doctrine of 
unique circumstances to an “extension” of the deadline for filing notice of appeal), 
overruled by Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). 
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The rulemakers could provide a mechanism for balancing finality 
with the interests of fairness and equity by adopting the current for-
mulation of the doctrine with some minor changes or using commit-
tee notes to relax interpretation.  By placing the doctrine within Civil 
Rule 6 and its analogs, the rulemakers would provide the doctrine va-
lidity for all deadlines contained in the rules.  Thus, current doctrine 
should be changed to excuse late filing “where a party [or court] has 
performed an act which, if [valid], would postpone the deadline for 
filing his appeal and [if the act was done by a party] has received spe-
cific assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been properly 
done.”278  The addition of “or court” would apply the doctrine to cases 
where the court has confused the litigant without fault by a party, as in 
Bowles.279  The notes could make clear that an act includes actions that 
could never be considered properly done, such as requesting an ex-
tension for a notice of appeal.  In addition, the definition of “specific 
assurance” must be loosened,280 because granting a post-trial motion 
on the merits or ordering a hearing could give a litigant the impres-
sion that the time to file a notice of appeal was tolled. 
The doctrine should be loosened enough to provide litigants as-
surance that a plain interpretation of the district court’s actions will 
not result in the loss of their rights.  This depends greatly on whether 
or not the presumption favors the litigant who relies on the district 
court’s action.  The current version of the doctrine of unique circum-
stances, besides relying on the litigant having done an improper act, 
also suffers from a presumption against finding that the district court 
misled the litigant.  In order to overcome the presumption, the liti-
gant must show that the court clearly and specifically stated to the liti-
gant that the action was timely; the litigant cannot rely solely on the 
district court’s actions having the normal import.281  For example, the 
litigant cannot rely on the district court’s extension of the time to file 
                                                          
278 This is the current formulation of the doctrine with proposed changes in brack-
ets.  See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179 (1989), for the formulation 
that is the basis of the proposal. 
279 In fact, by retaining the claim-processing-rule framework, a party’s improper 
action will likely face objection for untimeliness by the opposition, because the opposi-
tion’s failure to object would render the motion valid.  See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 
443, 459-60 (2004).  The primary source of confusion and error will be the court itself, 
either by improperly overruling a timeliness objection by the opposition or by merely 
miscalculating time when setting a deadline. 
280 The doctrine currently requires a specific verbal assertion by the court to the 
party that the act was proper.  Osterneck, 489 U.S. at 178-79. 
281 Id. at 178. 
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a post-trial motion as tolling the time to appeal, even though that reli-
ance is the natural import of such an action.282
An argument could be made that allowing such reliance assumes 
that the litigant knows the rules regarding tolling but not the rules re-
garding calculating times or deadlines.  The district court, however, 
causes the problem with calculating time, not the litigant.  The true 
problem is that the district court, even if abetted by the litigant filing 
an untimely motion, has acted contrary to the rules and forced the 
litigant to choose between relying on the judge and relying on her 
own interpretation of the rules.  Denying the litigant the ability to ap-
peal because of reliance on a judicial proclamation or the natural im-
port of such a proclamation represents the height of institutional un-
fairness, especially for a pro se litigant. 
CONCLUSION
The proposed changes have benefits in three areas over the cur-
rent system as it appears to be developing:  First, they would separate 
issues of finality from issues of jurisdiction, clarifying the future juris-
prudence of both.  Second, they would increase transparency and 
identify who has authority to make any further amendments.  Third, 
they would increase the ability of federal judges to equitably decide 
issues involving post-trial motions and notices of appeal. 
As history shows, the nature of post-trial motions and notices of 
appeal have confounded courts.  The label of “jurisdictional” trans-
ferred too easily from the previous statutory regime to the rules.  In 
large part, this can be explained by the somewhat shaky authority of 
the rulemakers in trying to supersede the previous system, while at the 
same time not clarifying the exact consequences of failure to meet the 
deadlines.  The Court was thus left to fill the void with its contradic-
tory and unsettled jurisdictional decisions.  Conversely, the Court’s 
removal of the concept of jurisdiction from a place it should never 
have been applied—that is, to court-promulgated rules—would im-
prove the jurisprudence of jurisdiction. 
Currently, there are questions concerning the ability of the rule-
makers to independently amend their own ideas embodied in § 2107 
and Appellate Rule 4(a).  Repealing § 2107 or reversing Bowles would 
                                                          
282 See, e.g., Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 
2000) (refusing to recognize as timely a litigant’s notice of appeal after the district 
court improperly granted the litigant’s request for an extension of time to file a mo-
tion for a new trial).   
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clarify the position of the rulemakers and allow a single entity with 
expertise in the area to control almost all issues of finality and transfer 
of the case to the appellate level. 
The addition of equity to the current rules governing timing and 
notices of appeal would improve the fairness of the federal judicial 
system.  Litigants would not be led astray by federal judges errone-
ously setting deadlines or improperly overruling objections based on 
timeliness.  This exception would be narrow enough to not greatly in-
crease the federal workload or reduce the deadlines in the federal 
rules to mere guidelines.  It would also provide possible ways to ame-
liorate errors in drafting or confusing edicts that arise from amend-
ments to the rules.  Most importantly, the system of providing finality 
would provide a fair method of resolving issues with the rules and 
would clearly identify the actor responsible for the outcome. 
